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SALES OF STINGER MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA

HEARING

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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SALES OF STINGER MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA

TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1984

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 11 a.m., in room SD–124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Kasten, Jr. (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Kasten, D'Amato, Rudman, Specter, Inouye, and DeConcini.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR KASTEN

Senator KASTEN. The subcommittee will come to order.

The hearing this morning will examine the administration's decision-making process which led to the sale of STINGER missiles to Saudi Arabia and the justification for those sales and the justification for using emergency authority.

INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

Our witnesses this morning are Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; and Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

It is my understanding that General Gast is here instead of Mr. Armitage, but he is on his way; is that correct?

General GAST. We expect him. He is testifying before another Committee.

DOUBTS CONCERNING MISSILE SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA

Senator KASTEN. Two months ago the administration sent up a proposal to sell Saudi Arabia 1,200 STINGER missiles and 400

launchers. After an overwhelming expression of disapproval by Congress, the administration withdrew that proposal.

While the current sale to Saudi Arabia has been justified as an emergency and provided under emergency authority, there are many of us up here who nonetheless continue to have some doubts and questions concerning this sale.

Also, of course, we are interested in any future intentions with respect to STINGER missile sales to Saudi Arabia, as well as administration response to the Government of Kuwait's request for these missiles and other arms.

SITUATION IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The American people are again witnessing a series of rather bizarre events unfolding in the Middle East as the United States rushes STINGER missiles to Saudi Arabia primarily because two countries—Iraq and Syria—recipients of billions of dollars in financial support from Saudi Arabia—have stepped up their actions, together with Iran, in the conflict in that region.

We find ourselves in a position where Iraq and Syria, who are bitter rivals, both receive and continue to receive substantial backing from Saudi Arabia which enables them to buy billions of dollars worth of weapons from the Soviet Union, and in Iraq's case, French planes and missiles which have been used to attack Saudi and other oil tankers and now may be attacking, or at least said to be possibly attacking, the oil fields.

Thus, we have rushed STINGER missiles to the Saudis, ostensibly to protect them from the consequences of actions by two nations they are helping to bankroll. To say the least, this is all rather bizarre. More diplomacy and common sense, not weapons, would be a better way to diffuse the situation.

MORE INVOLVEMENT BY U.S. ALLIES PROBED

Another question I hope to discuss this morning with you gentlemen is why this has become a U.S. problem, why there are not more people, particularly the Japanese and the Europeans, taking a direct interest in the problems there.

It seems to me that the Europeans and the Japanese, in particular, are more dependent on that supply of oil than we are.

USE OF SPECIAL EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO INITIATE SALES

If nothing else comes out of this hearing, I think that you, as representatives of the administration, the State Department and Defense Department, should be aware of the damage which I believe you have done by using special emergency authority over a holiday weekend with Congress out of town.

At the very least you have abused the consulting process. For my own part and from the point of view of this committee, I can tell you such consultations will have little meaning to us in the future.

You must understand as a consequence of your action, you have jeopardized not only the emergency authority you used in this case, but probably other emergency authority available to the administration in the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.

We will be exploring ways to remedy legislatively the problems that I believe have been created.

In addition, I believe your action is yet another argument for those in Congress who wish to enact very restrictive legislation on future arms sales.

In other words, you are playing right into the hands of people who have been opposing arms sales, squeezing the administration down to less and less flexibility because of these kinds of actions.

Gentlemen, I would like each of you to make a brief comment and then we will begin with questions from the committee, but before we begin, I would like to ask Senator Inouye if he has a brief opening statement.

Senator INOUYE. I do not, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Then we will begin with Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL H. ARMACOST, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN GULF WAR

Mr. ARMACOST. Thank you, Senator Kasten.

I am delighted to be here to testify before the subcommittee. I have provided a statement for the record and will not read that. Let me make a few preliminary comments.

The first is that there are contradictory calls for U.S. action on the gulf war. On the one hand there is public speculation about U.S. military intervention.

On the other there is anxiety that the United States might intervene and questions about whether we should take any military initiative.

We have an important interest in maintaining access to the gulf as a matter of principle and because one-fifth of the free world's oil comes from there. Because of our strategic interest in containing Soviet expansionism and radical influences in the region and because of our regional cooperation with the Arab Gulf States, we cannot be indifferent to threats to gulf security.

Consequently, we are watching developments very closely. We are cooperating with others in seeking a negotiated end to the war and most importantly, we are assisting the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, in providing for their own defense.

We are not seeking to intervene with military force; we have not volunteered. We have not been requested to intervene. We would consider military involvement only in response to an open public request, as we have said, in the context of cooperation of our allies.

ATTACKS ON GULF SHIPPING

The war has recently escalated from attacks on freighters in the war zone in the northern gulf to attacks on tankers outside the war zone.

Last month there were four Iranian attacks on tankers near Northern Saudi Arabia. All those tankers were voyaging to or from Kuwait. Three were Kuwait vessels and one was a Saudi Arabian vessel.

It was in the context of that escalation and the heightened threat, I think legitimate apprehension on the part of Saudi Arabia, that attacks on land installations might be next, that Saudi Arabia urgently requested on May 22 a supply of STINGER's and augmented aerial

refueling capability and extra tankers to extend the flying time of their F–15's.

U.S. RESPONSE TO SAUDI REQUEST

We responded to that request in accordance with our policy of support for Gulf State protection. We felt our response had to be militarily significant.

We also felt the major escalation that had occurred and the increasing frequency of those attacks required that it be prompt. It was, therefore, in that context that the President used his authority to waive the usual notification to Congress for weapons transfer in order to deal with a genuine emergency.

As you know, he made a Presidential determination that we would dispatch 200 launchers with 200 additional refire STINGER missiles and deploy a KC–10 tanker to augment Saudi refueling capability.

We felt that any lesser response would have seemed tentative, it would not have provided the necessary assurance to our Saudi Arabian friends, and would possibly embolden Iran, rather than deter it. We felt that the nature of the emergency required swift action.

CRITICISM OF STINGER MISSILE SALES

The sale of the STINGER's has been criticized because of the possible diversion of that system to others. We have felt the sale of the STINGER's poses no threat to any other states in the region, nor does it conflict with firm, longstanding U.S. support for the security of Israel.

The STINGER is a short-range, portable air defense weapon. It is manually aimed and fired. Its purpose is to defend against attacking aircraft which have evaded other long-range defenses.

In selling the STINGER outside NATO, we are requiring verifiable assurances and precautions against any diversion of the system. These include random inventory checks, separate storage of the grip stock and missile when it is not operationally deployed.

Additionally, we have a security relationship with Saudi Arabia that extends over more than 30 years. There has been no single instance, to our knowledge, of diversion of U.S. military equipment supplied to Saudi Arabia.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we feel that we responded to an escalating threat which continues even today in a manner that meets the military requirements that serve important U.S. political interests, as well as sending a political signal of both assurance and deterrence of attack against one of our friends, without threatening any other states.

We feel that the President's decision contributes not only to Saudi Arabia's security, but to stability within the region.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armacost follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL H. ARMACOST
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Administration's decision to respond favorably to specific Saudi requests for military equipment and support. Before addressing our recent decision to sell Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia and send an air force KC-10 tanker to the Kingdom, I would like to note how those decisions complement our broader policy not only in the Gulf but throughout Southwest Asia.

Our policy in the Gulf enjoys broad bipartisan support and reflects the decisions of two Administrations. It consists of four crucial elements:

--First, a clear recognition of the need to ensure the free flow of oil to the West.

--Second, the strategic necessity of containing the expansion of Soviet and other radical influence throughout the region.

--Third, a consequent need to respond firmly and decisively to requests from the Gulf states for appropriate and justifiable security assistance. The states in the area must be confident that our interests in the Gulf are sufficiently important for us to help in a crisis. The United States has to be seen as a credible partner in the search for stability and security.

--Finally, and equally important, whatever steps we take must complement our efforts to achieve peace between the Arab states and Israel. Our Middle Eastern policy is built on the

premise that we can foster and encourage a secure, strong and confident Israel while, at the same time, helping to ensure that our moderate Arab friends have the support and assistance they need to oppose Soviet and radical expansionism in the area. These two goals are not contradictory; they are mutually supportive. Our policy toward the war in the Gulf reflects that reality.

The Iran-Iraq war has gone on for nearly four years -- at enormous cost in human lives and treasure. The land war remains stalemated, without any prospective end in sight. The Iranians have amassed heavy forces in the south in preparation for a major offensive. We do not believe the result of such an offensive, if it comes, will alter the stalemate. The Iranians remain adamant in their demand for a military victory and the fall of the Iraqi government. As long as Iranian intransigence continues, a diplomatic solution will be difficult to achieve.

Nevertheless, we must continue to exert our efforts, along with our friends and allies, to seek an end to the fighting and a negotiated settlement through diplomatic means. We have pursued this course bilaterally as well as multilaterally, including in the U.N. We have made clear that we are neutral in the war, we uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both sides, and we sell arms to neither. We have been particularly concerned about attacks on non-belligerent shipping serving neutral ports, which is a dangerous escalation and widening of the war. However, as we have stated in the past, we have deplored attacks on all non-belligerent shipping and firmly support the right of freedom of navigation in international waters.

The Gulf states share our desire to de-escalate the current threat through diplomatic rather than military means. Should

diplomatic efforts fail, the Gulf states believe they can defend their ships and oil installations primarily with their own military resources. It is in our interest to support the efforts of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to provide for their own defense. We believe that the U.S. should encourage those states which seek to acquire the means of protecting themselves from aggression rather than depending on forces from the outside.

Only as a last resort would the United States consider direct military involvement -- and then only in appropriate circumstances and if we were asked to do so. American military actions in the Gulf would require the cooperation of the Gulf Arab states to provide the necessary facilities. We would also consult closely with Congress. We would have intensive discussions with our major allies to see what mutually helpful roles we could play.

Our interests and those of our closest allies and friends are directly threatened by the escalation of the war in the Gulf. The Iraqi attacks on shipping and the Iranian retaliatory attacks on non-belligerent shipping to neutral ports has raised the war to a new and dangerous level. In its first three attacks on oil tankers, Iran appears to have deliberately targeted Kuwait and Saudi-flag ships near the Saudi coast. Saudi Arabia, as the largest of the Gulf Cooperation Council states with the most extensive infrastructure and oil facilities, could be directly threatened by further escalation. If the war spread to these GCC states and their fellows, it could endanger Saudi Arabia and deny crucial oil supplies to much of the free world.

Access to Persian Gulf oil is vital to the world economy.

Some 20-25 percent of the oil consumed in the Free World is produced in the Gulf, which is now exporting nearly 8 million barrels of oil per day, much of it to our major allies in Europe and Asia. Although only three percent of our oil comes directly from the Gulf, we cannot be isolated from the world oil market. Disruptions in the market and the concommitant increase in prices that could follow would directly and adversely affect the United States. The recovery now underway in our own economy and that of the rest of the world could be cut short.

We therefore faced--indeed we continue to face--a dangerous situation which threatens vital Western interests.

In such a situation, it is natural and sensible to support the efforts of the Gulf states to provide for their own defense. Saudi Arabia, facing an immediate danger to its security, requested on May 22nd to purchase on an urgent basis air defense related equipment. The principle that a sound defense is the basic deterrent to aggression has long been a fundamental premise of U.S. policy that has enjoyed broad public support.

In addition to requesting accelerated delivery of certain munitions already in the sales pipeline, the Saudis sought:

--immediate delivery of Stinger air defense missiles; and,
--provision of aerial refueling capability for their F-15s.

These requests are clearly related. Our own concept of air defense calls for a layered system. Assistant Secretary Armitage can speak to this in more detail, but the basic idea is to interdict an intruder as far out as possible, with your planes, and from there work back through long range area

defense missiles to short range or point defense of individual targets. Tanker support increases the duration and effectiveness of combat air patrols, the Stinger enhances point defense. Both items were needed urgently, and we were determined to respond immediately.

Our response to the military requirement must be seen in the political context in the region. First, Iran must understand that the desire we, our allies and the states in the region have for a peaceful solution is not a reaction born of weakness. Statements without action to support them have no deterrent effect and may invite aggression. Provision of the Stingers and the tanker are firm proof of our support for the principles we have been declaring. This step was taken without the deployment of American troops or direct action on our part. Indeed with these actions we sought to make direct intervention unnecessary. They were consistent with the desire of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to handle the problem themselves.

Second, we also had to look at the political implications of our decision on our relations with Saudi Arabia and the moderate Arab states. Our bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia is the keystone of our strategic interests in the Gulf, and central to that relationship is our security assistance program. If we failed to provide urgently needed support, at a time of clear and undisputed emergency, we would seriously undercut the common understanding which supports the very structure of our bilateral relationship.

Finally, we had to be certain that the provision of the Stinger dovetailed with our other major strategic interests in Southwest Asia. A central concern was that the equipment be

adequately safeguarded so it did not pose a threat to any of our friends by falling into the hands of terrorists. We are confident that the rigorous system of safeguards on the Stinger meets the most exacting criteria. Also, we firmly believe that helping the Gulf states oppose radical aggression not only supports our our goals in the area but also makes the region a more secure and stable place for our many friends.

Once we had made the basic decision to respond, we had to address the issue of how fast and how many. It was clear that we faced an emergency military requirement. It was essential that we send a clear and unequivocal signal, to friend and adversary alike, that we will support our friends when they need help. The President concluded that the important national security interests involved justified his use of the special waiver authority. The decision was not made lightly; this is the first time that this Administration has used this provision of the law. The waiver authority was used only once previously, by the Carter Administration to provide arms to Yemen. Yet the need on this occasion was immediate, real and critical. It required a decisive and expeditious step, and the President acted accordingly.

The decision to send 400 Stingers reflected our assessment of the immediate threat and the availability of Stingers in the U.S. inventory. We were convinced that we needed to send a militarily significant quantity rather than make a purely symbolic gesture. We took into account the views of Congressional leaders. We consulted informally over several days, eliciting in response a wide variety of views.

Our rough calculations showed that the Saudis, if they were to defend all threatened areas, could certainly make use of a considerably larger number of Stingers than were provided.

After intensive deliberations in the Administration, and weighing the results of our consultations, we decided that 200 systems with 200 refires (a total of 400 missiles) was an appropriate response and could be provided from available stocks.

Our decision to send a KC-10 tender to Saudi Arabia complements the Stinger sale. The former will give the Saudi Air Force increased loiter time thereby enhancing its defensive capabilities. The latter supplies needed point defense.

Our decisions were a prudent yet clear response to an escalating emergency which threatens Saudi Arabia. They satisfied a clear military need. In addition, by providing the missiles rapidly in response to an immediate need, as well as sending the additional tankers, we sent a political signal of both reassurance and deterrence. It was a measured response which promotes regional stability and security.

I would be happy to respond to your questions.

SAUDI REQUEST

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, thank you.

I think to begin with, let me just say that you got the request from the Saudis on May 22.

Is that correct?

Mr. ARMACOST. That is correct.

Senator KASTEN. Over here or over there? Is that the time Secretary Murphy was traveling?

Mr. ARMACOST. No; on May 22.

Senator KASTEN. Here?

Mr. ARMACOST. Yes.

Senator KASTEN. That was not the first time the Saudis had requested the STINGER missiles, was it?

Mr. ARMACOST. No. There had been a request——

Senator KASTEN. Or has it been on the "wish list?"

Mr. ARMACOST. We notified the Congress and withdrew that request earlier in the year over a political difficulty.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD W. MURPHY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

SAUDI REQUEST FOR STINGER MISSILE

Mr. MURPHY. I believe, Senator, it has been on the Saudis' wish list for over 2 years and was submitted for informal notification in February, but withdrawn along with the Jordanian notification in March.

Senator KASTEN. Would it be fair to say that on May 22, then, you received a reiteration of the request for the types of equipment you had heard about when you were traveling; they wanted to talk about surface-to-air missiles, rocket systems, advanced air-to-ground munitions, F–15 multiple ejection racks, F–15 fuel tanks?

That is just one item on that list?

Mr. MURPHY. That is one item on that list. That is the sole item that was requested of me on an emergency basis when I was in Saudi Arabia, which I reported to Washington after my meeting on May 22.

It was couched in terms of the urgency of the need that the Saudis felt. They had had attacks on Saudi-Kuwaiti-bound merchantmen, such as attacks by Iranian aircraft on the 13th, 14th, and 16th of May, as I recall the dates.

Discussion with the Saudis indicated that they were pursuing very active diplomacy, and to refer in brief to your own comment about more diplomacy being needed, I would like to assure you that we have been very vigorously pursuing diplomatic initiative on the Iraq-Iran war for the last, well, really since the inception of the war, almost 4 years ago, as have the Saudis.

Witness their latest initiatives in asking special emissaries to travel to Tehran.

Senator KASTEN. Was the request the Secretary is talking about for 100, 200, or 1,200 missiles?

Mr. MURPHY. It was not for a specific number. It was a request for urgent, immediate shipment of an unspecified number of missiles.

CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Senator KASTEN. On Thursday, the 24th, I was contacted by State Department officials and told that the administration was contemplating an emergency sale to the Saudis of 100 launchers with missiles and 100 refires.

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That was on Thursday, the 24th. At that particular time we also had conversations with other administration officials.

At noon on Friday, the 25th, Congress was still being consulted with respect to 100 launchers with missiles and 100 refires. I was told and I understand others who received briefings during that time, including other members of this committee, were told, both on Thursday and Friday that these numbers were based on assessment of need and on the availability of this equipment.

Without going into details on the U.S. readiness, at one point we were told that was all that was available. That is one thing we might discuss with General Gast.

We were also told it would take between 24 and 28 months to manufacture the replacements or the additional missiles.

Sometime on Friday night it was decided they would bump the numbers. I also found out during Thursday and Friday some others in the administration were pushing for the 1,200 number still.

How did the number get from 100 to 200?

Why was the 1,200 backed away from and how many missiles in fact were available?

ADMINISTRATION DECISION

Mr. ARMACOST. Let me start and then ask General Gast to address the question of availability, Senator.

I think it is true that we were initially talking 100 plus 100, as you suggest. The effort was also to balance on one end, as you likewise suggested, availability with what we perceived to be the requirement, military and political, in Saudi Arabia.

The decision in principle, I think, was made on Friday to consider a larger number, but that was still being discussed within the Government on Friday.

A firm decision was made, I think, that day, whereupon we prepared to talk further with the leadership in the Congress, the key committee chairmen, and minority leaders over the weekend. But the decision was made on Friday.

It represented another look at what number would meet the requirement of the situation, also without stripping our own stocks.

Let me ask General Gast to amplify on the latter issue.

DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY (DSAA)

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PHILIP C. GAST, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

STINGER MISSILE TRADEOFF

General GAST. Mr. Chairman, considerations were given both to availability and impact on readiness as well as what would be required to give an adequate deterrent capability, given the number of key facilities that needed to be defended by the STINGER system.

There was that tradeoff of all those factors. It was judged that 200 was the appropriate number to give a sense of security as well as to provide deterrent capabilty as those people could be trained in a reasonably short period of time in the command and control system.

It is true that to produce the STINGER system requires approximately 29 months lead time on producing those STINGER's. That equates to substantially less than 2 months' worth of production capability of those that are on order now and in fact these funds from the sale will be used to extend that production of those missiles.

Senator KASTEN. Do these missiles come out of existing stocks?

As a result of this sale, is our force less well prepared?

General GAST. These missiles came out of existing stocks. To be sure, there are 200 grip stocks and 200 missiles that will not be available to the forces today that we have in our inventory.

STINGERS AVAILABLE TO U.S. FORCES

Senator KASTEN. How many are available to our forces today?

General GAST. That number is classified, as one might guess.

However, it is not a significant or an adverse impact on readiness. One always wants to have more in production. Given the fact it is about a month and a half's worth of production capability, we did not believe it to have a significant or adverse impact.

Senator KASTEN. We will ask you to provide that information to us on a classified basis because in that discussion—you and I did not discuss this particularly, but people working for both of us did during those dates—we were told flat out we could not afford to give up more missiles than the first request.

We were told we didn't have them available. If they were to become available, they would have to be manufactured under that timeframe. We were told that by people working for you.

The next day they found double the number.

General GAST. I will provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

STINGER INVENTORY

At the time of the decision to provide Stingers to Saudi Arabia, U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps units held [deleted] Stinger weapon rounds and missiles. In addition, there were [deleted] Stingers in the depots waiting issue to units. In fiscal year 1984, the Army's Stinger production averaged [deleted] units per month.

DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY

Senator KASTEN. I would like to explore this emergency question.

How do you define this so-called emergency?

Why did it occur when Congress was about to take a Memorial Day break when these negotiations had been going on for a number of weeks?

I guess the bottom line is did you declare an emergency in order to get around the congressional process?

One of the things that would be helpful to us is, in these discussions did you say, "Well, could we get it?"

I am told in these discussions, both at State and Defense, people said, "Yes, but I am not sure we can get it through Congress. What else can we do? Maybe we can use the emergency authority. How would that work? That way we can get it through Congress."

We are talking not only about capability and need here, we are talking about the administration's trying to move something through one way that they were either unable or unwilling to move through another.

Mr. Secretary, first of all, how do you define "emergency?"

Why does it occur on a Memorial Day recess and aren't you using this process to get around Congress and, in fact, didn't you discuss the use of this process in order to get around Congress with either the 1,200 number, the 400 number or the 200 number?

Mr. ARMACOST. Senator, the emergency arose not out of the dates of the congressional recess, but attacks which, as Ambassador Murphy mentioned, were taking place in the period immediately before May 22, when we received an urgent request.

There were, I believe, five such attacks, three of them on Saudi Arabia and one on Kuwaiti flag vessels in waters close to Saudi territory. This represented a very major escalation in the conflict.

For some time there had been, to be sure, attacks on belligerent shipping within the exclusion zone declared by one of the belligerents, but these represented attacks on neutral shipping close to Saudi territory.

It seems not surprising that they regarded this with some alarm. It was that increasing frequency of attacks that prompted their urgent request to us. It came on the 22d. That is Tuesday.

We worked this urgently because we regarded their request as a legitimate one under the circumstances. It was not a matter of trying to circumvent Congress.

Perhaps we can always do these consultations better. I think in retrospect we could have, but the fact is we were testing the waters here because we wanted to be in touch with the people on the Hill. We made no effort over the weekend to evade contact with Congress. Indeed, I made a number of calls, myself, over the weekend.

It wasn't a matter of slipping something through over the weekend. It was rather a matter dealing with an urgent situation on the ground which came up in a way which required from us a prompt and decisive response.

MURPHY VISIT TO GULF STATES

Senator KASTEN. It is my understanding that when Secretary Murphy visited the various Arab states, one of the things he said is, "Would you request of us that we come to your assistance?"

It is my understanding a number of them said, "Maybe we might, but in order for us to request your assistance, we may demand of you, that you provide certain weapons that are on our wish list, including the STINGER missiles."

Is that true or false?

Mr. ARMACOST. Let me ask Ambassador Murphy to speak directly to this.

Mr. MURPHY. No, Senator, that is not an accurate version of the way either I presented our positon or the answers I received in the course of the tour of the Gulf States which I made in the month of April.

I did make plain to those with whom I met, and this was a tour which took me to all six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, that we had no desire to intervene militarily in the gulf conflict.

I said that we hoped they would be able to manage the conflict by themselves.

I added that if the time came that they found their resources were not up to the challenge they were confronting and they were to need our assistance, that it was only prudent and only common sense that they consult with us before such an emergency request would be made, because our ability to respond would be inevitably influenced by the degree of coordination and degree of discussions which had gone on in advance.

I did emphasize that we would have to have a public request, that the American Congress and the American people would not understand anything short of a public request for American assistance.

Senator KASTEN. But they did not say as a pre-condition of that public request that you or this administration had to provide them with part of their ongoing wish list of weapons?

Mr. MURPHY. No, sir. They put it this way, that they felt they could manage the conflict in the gulf by themselves.

This was, I would note, before the escalation that Mr. Armacost has referred to, escalation in terms of the attacks on nonbelligerent shipping heading for nonbelligerent ports.

They said they would prefer to handle it by themselves, but there were equipment requests, equipment needs about which they had notified us over the years, and some of which we had not responded to. They wanted to handle it by themselves, but to do that, the message was basically "Give us the tools, and we will do the job."

Senator KASTEN. My understanding is that there is a link here and that the weapons were a precondition to their asking.

You are saying that you disagree with my interpretation?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Senator KASTEN. I have one further question and this will be a question that will come up throughout this hearing in terms of the numbers. Let me just ask you another specific question.

SAUDI MEETINGS WITH ADMINISTRATION FOR HIGHER NUMBERS

Was Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, meeting on the afternoon of Friday, the 25th, with White House officials pushing for larger numbers?

In effect, was Prince Bandar meeting with the administration negotiating for higher numbers?

Mr. ARMACOST. I frankly don't know the answer to that question, Senator.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Murphy, do you know?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know.

Mr. ARMACOST. We will supply that for the record.

Senator KASTEN. We will look into that further.

[CLERK'S NOTE: The response is classified and has, therefore, been retained in the subcommittee files.]

CAPABILITIES OF STINGER

Senator KASTEN. Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUYE. It is my understanding that all modern attack aircraft in both the Iranian and Iraqi Air Forces are capable of carrying infrared countermeasures which can defeat the STINGER guidance system.

Is that your understanding also?

General GAST. Senator, I believe you are referring to advanced technology and capabilities to defeat the basic STINGER. That does take advanced technology. I do not believe that exists within the Iranian Air Force. It has not been provided by the United States, and I doubt it has by any other country.

I doubt that that capability has been provided, although it may very well exist. I do not know of its existence because it requires modifications. It has not been provided by our armed forces.

Senator INOUYE. According to the Library of Congress Research Division and upon checking with the Pentagon, the response they got was that both the Iranian and Iraqi Air Forces have the capability. They just don't know to what extent these countermeasures have been deployed.

Furthermore, that the STINGER's that have been provided the Saudis are not the advanced ones.

General GAST. They are not the advanced ones.

Senator INOUYE. So, according to the Research Division, the STINGER has very questionable effectiveness.

Is that correct?

General GAST. I would say that is incorrect. If all of the aircraft in the Iranian inventory or that of any adversary had the latest technology or ability to defeat an IR missile, then the effectiveness would be reduced. That situation does not exist.

Senator INOUYE. Are you confident that they don't have that capability?

General GAST. To defeat this in any substantial number or take away from the current effectiveness.

Senator INOUYE. You are certain that the Iranians don't have it?

General GAST. I am not saying they don't have it. It has not been demonstrated that it would have a significant and adverse impact on the capabilty of the STINGER missile system to enable the Saudi Arabians to defend those key facilities.

TRAINING FOR USERS OF STINGER

Senator INOUYE. I have been told that the present guidance system will require a 10-second response time and the personnel would have to be well trained.

Are you satisfied that the Saudis have the trained personnel available to handle the STINGER?

General GAST. They will be trained before they in fact deploy them. There is a training program associated with them. Yes, sir, we are very careful about that.

Senator INOUYE. You are suggesting that the reports submitted to this committee by the Congressional Research Service are not true at all?

General GAST. I have not seen the report, sir. It may be true in a series of facts.

All I am saying is that the STINGER system as provided to the Government of Saudi Arabia would have a significant deterrence capability against any attack aircraft. There may be some aircraft that have some defeating mechanism on them, but they have not been demonstrated to that extent.

Senator INOUYE. If the aircraft do have that capability, then the effectiveness is questionable.

Don't you think the STINGER missile would have greater utility for terrorist attack against commercial aircraft?

General GAST. I believe there are two questions there.

One is, is the missile capable of dealing with attacking aircraft and would this particular STINGER provided to the Government of Saudi Arabia be a liability to the region and to themselves if it got away from them?

I think the answer to that one is the terms and conditions of the sale are very stringent as previously agreed with the Saudi Government before they took the delivery of them that they would comply with the safeguards which are even greater than those we insist on with our own forces in NATO as far as separation of certain items to be sure they are not put together.

SAFEGUARDS

Senator INOUYE. What are the safeguards?

General GAST. They generally ascribe to the security within storage areas to be sure they are not penetrable, that they are adequately guarded, that when they are stored, there are certain components that are separated so that if someone happened to get into one of those highly guarded facilities, it would take two components to put together, and we have random access to them to account for and inspect them on occasion.

Of course, the first safeguard is an agreement by the Saudis to protect the technology as well as these kinds of items, either one of which we have had no evidence that they have violated in any sense.

Senator INOUYE. Are you really satisfied with the effectiveness of security by the Saudi armed forces?

General GAST. Yes, sir. Their ability to secure this kind of technology is significant and proven.

Senator INOUYE. I bring this up because I have been told that the most secure place in all of Saudi Arabia is Mecca and not too long ago a whole army of terrorists charged through there, notwithstanding the security forces.

General GAST. I cannot respond to that particular question.

However, I can assure you that we worked very hard with them to assure this kind of security, and we are satisfied with it.

Mr. ARMACOST. I wonder if I can ask Ambassador Murphy to comment.

I make the general point in our experience with the Saudis that we know of no single instance in which military equipment we have supplied to them over the years has been diverted to third-party use. It is with that record in mind that we have confidence these safeguard arrangements are satisfactory.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, if I might comment, on the Mecca incident of 1979, the attack on the principal mosque in Mecca, I think that was clearly an unthinkable target. It was not a military target, it was not a storage area. It was not an area over which the Saudi Army has responsibility for Saudi military security.

The authorities were taken by surprise by an unimaginable act of blasphemy, as they called it in those days.

I don't think it is comparable to the question of the security measures they apply to their weapons storage.

ALLEGATIONS OF SAUDI DIVERSION

Senator INOUYE. Last year in, I believe, two newspaper articles allegations were made that when the Israelis overran PLO bases, they found in their arsenal missiles and weapons that we had provided the Saudis.

Is that allegation correct?

Mr. ARMACOST. No; it is not, Senator.

We have had claims that M–16's, for example, had been found that had previously been sold to the Saudis and ended in other hands. We checked these allegations with great care.

In checking the serial numbers given for the M–16's, we discovered, first, that we had never supplied Saudi Arabia with M–16's.

We discovered, second, that the serial numbers accorded with weapons that had previously been sold to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

In fact, the weapons, I believe, if I recall correctly, were found in the hands of Lebanese Armed Forces rather than the PLO representatives at the time, I believe it was when the base at Sidon was overwhelmed by the Israeli Defense Forces.

There was another case in which a marking was provided us, I believe, relating to alleged sales of ammunition. Again this was a marking which was not at the time on a particular case or any packing crate or anything, but likewise in pursuing that claim, we were never able to establish a clear trail back to equipment that we had supplied to Saudi Arabia.

We did check with great care and asked for additional information, which I believe was never provided.

JAPANESE AND EUROPEAN EFFORTS

Senator INOUYE. The Chairman in his opening remarks indicated very correctly that the Japanese and the Europeans are the major beneficiaries of the fossil fuel of that area.

What are they doing besides selling EXOCET's and armaments to both sides?

Mr. ARMACOST. All have been engaged alongside the United States in diplomatic efforts to urge restraint on both parties. The EC–10 Ministers issued statements. They have made demarches to the parties directly concerned.

I believe a Japanese diplomat is currently in Tehran. They do have access to both parties. They seek to engage themselves diplomatically. We consult closely with our allies, most notably the British and French, to project military power in that region, sharing analyses and discussing possible ways of meeting various circumstances.

We have worked with them and others to deal with any potential disruptions of oil supplies. We have slightly different relationships in the area.

You mentioned the French supply of EXOCET's. We do not ourselves supply either side. We have on occasion discussed this with the French. They have a different view. There are limits to our influence with countries on questions like military supply.

There are dilemmas for them, too. They do supply the EXOCET. They do supply the F–1 aircraft. So do the Russians supply advanced arms. I believe they are perhaps now the major supplier of arms to Iraq.

So, the dilemma we face is one of limitations of our influence on a question of this kind, and the French, for example, face dilemmas of the same kind.

Dick, would you like to add anything?

Mr. MURPHY. On the question of influence, Senator, yes, in both the case of Iraq and Iran probably the major suppliers are the Communist states today.

In the case of Iran, North Korea, East European states and Moscow, either directly or through stocks in Libya. They have been a major supplier to Baghdad over the years, and that has been reinforced, apparently, by agreements struck in the last few months.

RISK TO AMERICAN PERSONNEL

Senator INOUYE. In this exercise aren't we risking the lives of American military personnel?

Mr. ARMACOST. Our objective, Senator, has been to supply military equipment, in order to permit the Saudis to defend themselves and to remove or reduce the likelihood of being called upon to intervene directly, ourselves.

Senator INOUYE. KC–10's are being manned by our people, aren't they?

Mr. ARMACOST. They are indeed, but these are unarmed aircraft that are well beyond any combat zone.

Senator INOUYE. Don't we have in Saudi Arabia over 1,300 troops?

Mr. ARMACOST. I will ask one of my Pentagon colleagues to ascertain the precise number.

General GAST. There are 1,300 military people there in training and assistance, but none of them are in that sense armed or allowed to participate in any combat operations.

Senator INOUYE. What other country is providing arms or unarmed military personnel?

Mr. ARMACOST. To Saudi Arabia?

Senator INOUYE. Is any European country providing that sort of assistance?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. There are both French and British, and I believe perhaps one or two others who have.

The Saudis have diversified their arms program over the last decade in their sources of supply. I am sure both the British and French are represented in the country, as is Pakistan.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you.

Senator KASTEN. Thank you, Senator.

I see that we are now joined by Mr. Armitage. We are pleased that you are here with us.

There is one question I would like to ask before going to Senator D'Amato.

You were part of the ongoing negotiations that were taking place on Thursday, Friday and Saturday in terms of the number of missiles, that maybe we went from 1,200 to 100, up to 400, back to 200.

During Friday afternoon, the 25th, was Prince Bandar, Ambassador from Saudi Arabia, at the White House negotiating for larger numbers of STINGER missiles?

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEETINGS WITH SAUDI PRINCE BANDAR

Mr. ARMITAGE. First of all, I apologize for my late arrival. I was testifying in another part of the town, Senator.

Second, to my knowledge, on Friday I was not involved in any White House discussions with Prince Bandar. I had meetings with Prince Bandar. It was not a matter of plusing up or down the number of missiles.

It was just further reiterations of Saudi assistance needs. The discussion I had with Prince Bandar at the Pentagon was not plusing up or down any number of missiles.

Senator KASTEN. You were talking with him, but he was not lobbying for larger numbers?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Not for larger numbers. I was not in the White House meeting with him, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Senator D'Amato.

EVEN-HANDED POLICY

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, first, let me commend you for holding these hearings. I think it is right and appropriate that we ascertain whether or not the sale of these missiles and the manner in which the sale was handled was done in contravention of the congressional intent and whether a genuine emergency existed.

I seriously question the prudence of introducing the STINGER missiles into an area where large numbers of terrorists have operated in the past and continue to operate. I am concerned that this action will simply broaden the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

I also question whether or not the so-called even-handed policy that the United States has pursued in the Iran-Iraq war is not jeopardized as a result of this sale.

It seems to me that we talk about the Iranians and their attacks and yet the first attack made on shipping, on tankers, if I am given to understand correctly the reports, were made by the Iraqis.

Is that correct?

Mr. ARMACOST. The Iraqis have conducted air attacks on tankers in an exclusion zone.

The escalation that occurred recently was Iranian attacks against

neutral shipping serving nonbelligerent ports which represents an escalation.

Senator D'AMATO. I think that is a rather distorted point of view, but we can argue that. I think we are needlessly injecting ourselves into the situation.

The STINGER sale has the potential of precipitating our full-scale involvement in the conflict. We are creating a very clear picture for the Iranians that we are indeed going to martial our forces and those of our allies against them.

I can't see how we can talk about being even-handed when we have our allies like the French and their sophisticated weapon systems that have been used deliberately to sink oil tankers in that area.

Let us look at the attacks on the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 16th on those tankers. You have mentioned four attacks.

Do you know what kind of armament was used in those attacks?

Mr. ARMACOST. The attacks by Iraqi——

IRANIAN ATTACKS ON SAUDI SHIPPING

Senator D'AMATO. The Iranians. You indicate on the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 16th of May there were attacks undertaken on shipping, nonbelligerent shipping, and I believe you mentioned there were three Saudi tankers that were involved.

Mr. ARMACOST. I believe they were F–4 attacks.

Senator D'AMATO. What kind of rockets or missiles were used?

Were they not 2.73-inch rockets, unguided rockets?

Mr. ARMACOST. I think they are MAVERICK missiles on F–4 aircraft.

Senator D'AMATO. The fact of the matter is that the Iranians do have MAVERICK's, don't they?

Mr. ARMACOST. They do, yes.

Senator D'AMATO. Did they use MAVERICK's in that case?

How many of those ships were actually sunk?

What I am trying to say to you is that there is a vast difference if the Iranians wanted to use the MAVERICK, and, by the way, what is the range of a MAVERICK which the Iranians do have?

General GAST. It depends on what mode they would fire. It would probably be released around 5 miles.

Senator D'AMATO. The range is even longer; it can go to 10 miles?

General GAST. Depending on the capability of the pilot and how he uses it.

Senator D'AMATO. What then is the effect of the STINGER against the MAVERICK when the Iranians are discharging it at 10 miles if the STINGER has a range of 3 miles?

General GAST. One has a longer range than the other, but the STINGER is not used in isolation. It is used in conjunction with other defensive systems. Additionally, the STINGER is never employed on a target, but out from and around the target.

STINGER USE

Senator D'AMATO. We are letting the American people and the public believe and others believe that these STINGER's are going to be used in connection with guarding the shipping. That is not true.

We are not going to be able to provide any more security for those tankers. The fact of the matter is that the Iranians have not used them.

I am no defender of the Iranians. I suggest if you want them to go in and launch attacks against the Kuwaiti oil fields, begin to isolate them, push them into this kind of situation, and maybe that is exactly what we are going to have take place.

How effective are the STINGER's?

Maybe we should send them a better weapon. If our real intent is to say we want to see to it that oil should move unimpeded through this area, we want to protect that shipping, and I believe we have an obligation to do it, I think we are going about it the wrong way.

Where are the French, English, and Japanese with their money to help see to it that the world oil supply moves?

If you want to take the premise you are concerned about, why STINGER's?

It is a great weapon for terrorists, but how does this enhance the capability of the tanker out at sea under attack by an Iranian plane flying with the kind of weapon systems that they do have and you have indicated they have, the MAVERICK missiles?

General GAST. The STINGER is a good weapon system. We are continuing to produce it for ourselves. It is intended to assist them with the other military capabilities they have, to defend their key facilities from attacks should they occur, in conjunction with other systems that they have.

Senator D'AMATO. Then it does not enhance the defense of the tankers out at sea or in the gulf, does it?

General GAST. It will not go aboard those tankers because they are commercial. It will go aboard Saudi ships which are out there patrolling.

Senator D'AMATO. If they can go onboard a Saudi ship and the Saudi ship is next to the tanker, how is that going to enhance the defensive posture against the Iranians using a weapon system that has a range of 10 miles?

How can you deter that attack?

By the way, those attacks have not happened yet, have they?

General GAST. Which attacks?

WEAPONS SYSTEM USE BY IRANIANS

Senator D'AMATO. Are you aware of the Iranians using any of the sophisticated weapon systems that they have such as the MAVERICK missile?

The four ships that were attacked, what were they attacked with?

General GAST. I don't believe we know precisely what they were attacked with.

DEPLOYMENT OF STINGER

Senator D'AMATO. You do know whether or not they were under rocket attack?

How many of those ships were actually sunk?

Does anybody know?

None of them were, is that correct?

Would you call that maybe a warning?

Wasn't there some conjecture with respect to the Iranians saying, "Listen, fellows, you can't just keep attacking our ships."

We have the capability of doing that.

Do you really want them to step this up and have them use these other kinds of weapons systems and really have a full-scale involvement in that area?

Mr. ARMACOST. Maybe I can comment, Senator.

In the first place, the STINGER's may well be deployed not so heavily for shipping purposes, but to protect land-based installations. They have desalinization plants, oil fields, port facilities.

I presume a requirement for the STINGER is related to anxiety in Saudi Arabia that those land installations might come under attack; also an awareness that they have vulnerability in their air defense system which does consist of other weapon systems in dealing with low-level intrusions in their air space.

With respect to whether one is tilting one particular way, I think you raise an important question. As I said earlier, we are neutral in this conflict. We are not supplying arms to either side.

The fact of the matter is the Iraqis started the war, but they have indicated recently, and indeed for several years, their desire to end the conflict.

ATTACKS AGAINST NONBELLIGERENT SHIPPING

Senator D'AMATO. That is because they are losing the war. It is an incredible thing I see taking place. We have forgotten that Iraq started it.

By the way, I wish them both great success on each other. That is what we should be trying to do. I am going to tell you we have all underestimated the Iranians as to what they were going to do, what their capabilities are.

I just suggest that unless we come down evenhandedly, and we do have a legitimate interest in the region, and say we are not going to allow the interruption of oil to come from either side, we will see to it that the tankers from both areas are allowed to move unimpeded. That makes sense.

When you say we have not tilted, we certainly have. In the past several days 8 or 10 ships, Greek ships, merchant ships, other Panamanian ships, have been attacked and sunk.

By whom? The Iraqis. I don't see how we can say this is evenhanded. It just seems to me that we are going to be broadening this conflict because we have not taken time out to build a consensus with our allies to say, "All of us, French, English, the rest of Western Europe, you have a part to play to ensure that the oil supply continues

and that we will not tolerate from anyone, from any source, a deviation from that."

That is evenhandedness. Then you can say if the Iranians were to launch an attack on the oil fields of any one of these countries, that we would be perfectly justified, all of us together, and I would like a little Japanese money to support those operations, that we would then do whatever is necessary to protect what is in our vital interest and the interest of the free world.

The introduction of these weapon systems will do nothing but jeopardize further the relationships that we have with our allies there, create a situation that will not bring about the desired results and will not guarantee that oil flows.

If anything, it will bring about a more hostile reaction by the Iranians. That is my concern.

Mr. ARMACOST. Let me say we deplore all attacks on shipping in the gulf. We do particularly deplore attacks against neutral shipping in nonbelligerent waters.

Senator D'AMATO. How about Greek tankers?

Is that belligerent shipping?

Mr. ARMACOST. They are putting into belligerent ports. As I say, we deplore them all.

When the attacks by Iran began to go directly against nonparticipants in the hostilities in a very broad area, it seems to me that is particularly deplorable, and it is legitimate for us to assist our friends.

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Secretary, it is one thing to say nonbelligerent. What we did was an incredible thing in allowing the Shah of Iran to be undercut.

At this point in time the Kuwaitis and others are providing money and the Saudis are providing money, et cetera, and materially assisting the Iraqis.

To suggest these are nonbelligerent ports in the manner in which you have and when they have permitted their allies, such as the Iraqis, to undertake these kinds of attacks on shipping in the gulf, I think we have to understand why the Iranians might feel justified.

But I have gone beyond my time. I thank the chairman and I want to tell you I think this is a serious error on our part.

Senator KASTEN. Senator DeConcini.

OTHER NATIONS WITH STINGER

Senator DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, what other nations have STINGER missiles now?

Has that information been supplied?

Mr. ARMITAGE. NATO nations have them and so do Australia and Japan—also the ROK.

Perhaps Lieutenant General Gast could add to that.

General GAST. We have delivered to the Netherlands, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France.

Senator DECONCINI. How many does NATO have, General?

General GAST. That number is classified, but it is a significant number.

Senator DECONCINI. How many have been delivered to Korea?

General GAST. I am sorry, sir. Those numbers are classified. I will supply those for the record.

[The information follows:]

REQUESTS FOR STINGERS

The NATO countries of Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany have or have requested STINGER's. Korea has expressed interest in STINGER's, but has not yet ordered them under FMS. The following list of sales is provided for your information:

Stinger FMS cases:

Country	*Stingers ordered under FMS*	*Delivered*
Italy	[deleted]	[deleted]
Japan	[deleted]	[deleted]
Netherlands	[deleted]	[deleted]
Turkey	[deleted]	[deleted]
United Kingdom	[deleted]	[deleted]
France	[deleted]	[deleted]
Australia	[deleted]	[deleted]

JAPAN

Senator DECONCINI. Korea and NATO are the only countries?

Has Japan been supplied with them as well?

General GAST. Japan is procuring them.

Senator DECONCINI. Does Israel have any STINGER missiles?

General GAST. They have not asked for them.

Senator DECONCINI. They have not asked for them?

General GAST. No, sir.

SAUDI AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY

Senator DECONCINI. The Saudis purport to have an outstanding air defense capability.

Is there any reason that they have not used this until perhaps recently, in the last 24 hours?

What inquiries have we made as to the need, comparing the use of the STINGER missiles? Why have the Saudis not relied on the air force that we have generously helped supply them over the years?

What is the answer to that question?

Mr. ARMITAGE. If I might, Senator, you are correct in stating that the Saudis have a formidable air force, F–15's and armed with U.S. munitions.

But in the protection that we provide, our own concept, our doctrine in our own service, we have the aircraft farther out, the outer envelope of protection.

Then we have an intermediate envelope of protection with the I–HAWK which has a range of around 40 kilometers. Then we have for our own forces the STINGER as the point weapon with a range of approximately 3 miles.

It is interesting to note our own I-HAWK's have STINGER's organic to their deployment. It is a layered concept, if you will allow me to use that term.

Senator DECONCINI. Is there any evidence that indicates that the Saudi Air Force could not patrol and defend their shipping lanes with the air force they have?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I know of no evidence that would preclude them from doing that or does preclude them from being able to protect their own territory.

Senator DECONCINI. Wouldn't it make sense to let them rely on the resources they have, and we have already gone through struggles on those sales, but they are a fait accompli.

Wouldn't we be better off policywise to let them use what they have and to see what they have the capability to do before we give them another sophisticated weapon?

Mr. ARMITAGE. With all due respect, Senator, we may be off a little easier policywise. It is that there wouldn't be controversy. I am not sure we would be doing ourselves a favor in the long run if you look at our own doctrine the way we defend our own territory. That is what the Saudis want.

Senator DECONCINI. What favor are we doing ourselves here?

Mr. ARMITAGE. We felt in the deployment of STINGER's on an emergency basis to Saudi Arabia that we were assisting in deterrence. We want to keep the facilities in Saudi Arabia from being hit, from being dragged into this war, specifically the desalinization plants and oil facilities.

Senator DECONCINI. It is our conclusion that the F-15's and F-14's we have supplied there, the AWACS and tankers, and all the other material, are not sufficient to deter that action?

We have not deployed F-14's. The F-15's are a great aid in deterring that action.

Senator DECONCINI. I would ask you, sir, if they got through the F-15's , then what is next?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I can only point to our own doctrine.

Senator DECONCINI. It leaves me with the conclusion that we must not have the greatest faith that the Saudi Air Force can protect itself as it is armed today.

Mr. ARMITAGE. With all due respect again, sir, if that were the case, then it would leave us with the same lack of faith in our own forces as our doctrine calls for this layered defense.

Senator DECONCINI. Let me ask you this: Can the STINGER launcher be used for other missiles besides the STINGER?

Mr. ARMITAGE. No; it cannot be.

Senator DECONCINI. It cannot be adapted in any way?

Mr. ARMITAGE. It has never been adapted, to my knowledge.

General GAST. That is right.

LENDING STINGERS TO THE SAUDIS

Senator DECONCINI. In the negotiations with the Saudis, was the possibility of lending the launchers to the Saudi Arabians with the unused missiles and launchers to be returned to the United States after this threat has diminished ever discussed?

General GAST. Is your question: Was there discussion with the Saudis?

Senator DECONCINI. Was there any discussion about this and, if there was, why did we not lend or lease this missile to the Saudis with the understanding that they would be returned when the threat dissipated?

General GAST. There was some discussion within the administration, assuming we were going to provide a number of them, whether a lease or a sale was the proper way to go, and the determination clearly came out on the side of the sale.

Senator DECONCINI. Why?

General GAST. There is considerable legislative history and congressional sentiment about leasing versus sale. It is based on two or three principles.

One is you take them from the U.S. forces and you do not have money to buy new equipment to replace them. That is a major concern of ours, also the Congress as well as the Foreign Affairs Committees.

Second, if you provide them on a lease basis, then in fact we cannot procure more, and they are in their hands, and there is some sort of string to pull them back which is not a very satisfactory way for any country that is going to receive them.

It does not have any impact on our readiness to do that, and in fact they would be there for a longer period and require notification just as the sale would.

STINGER MISSILES FALLING INTO TERRORIST HANDS

Senator DECONCINI. One of the concerns that Senator Stennis asked me to request of this distinguished panel is: Can the administration guarantee that these STINGER's will not fall into terrorist hands?

I would like to know, first, can you guarantee that they will not fall into terrorist hands, and second, what security is being provided and would you not have more protection if these were on a loan or lease basis?

General GAST. We believe we would have the same protection whether they were on lease or loan or sale because there would be the same provisions.

The conditions of the sale or lease are very, very stringent, have been agreed upon by all nations. No one can guarantee that one will not get away. We have high confidence they will not get away, and we are not particularly concerned about that.

One of the reasons we are not concerned is because of conditions of the sale and our involvement with their agreement to monitor and to check on inventories very frequently.

Senator DECONCINI. One of the things that concerns me, General and Mr. Secretary, is that the Saudi Arabians have been financial supporters of the PLO for a number of years. The estimates range from $100 to $400 million annually. There certainly is indication that weapons as well as money have been transferred from the Saudis to the PLO.

What assurance do you have here that even if these STINGER's are not transferred, there will be any less monetary support given to the PLO?

General GAST. I can't comment on the validity of how much money has been provided.

Senator DECONCINI. Do you dispute that some money has been provided by the Saudis to the PLO?

General GAST. I will take your point as an assumption that perhaps they have, but one of the very important relationships we have, our Government with any government that receives our equipment, is whether in fact they violate the terms and conditions of the sale, that is, allowing our technology or a piece of an item or in any way training to go to another country without the expressed approval of the President or the Secretary of State representing the President.

If the Saudis or anyone else were to transfer any item, there would be the likelihood that the U.S. Government one way or the other would find out about that and no country we know of seriously wants to jeopardize its relationship with the United States and our Congress due to the transfer of that item.

Senator DECONCINI. You have that confidence in the Saudis?

General GAST. I do.

LEASING OF STINGER

Senator DECONCINI. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, maybe you can help me.

Was there any discussion about the lessening of monetary support that the Saudis have given the PLO in exchange for our arming them with the STINGER missile?

Mr. ARMACOST. In this particular case I think the discussions involved the safeguards that would assure that these did not get diverted into the hands of third parties.

If I may, I would like to go back to the question of leasing, because it was a subject of some discussion within the administration.

The conclusion that was drawn was that in the first place we were eager to convey a firm, rather than a tentative, signal to the Saudis, providing reassurance to them that they could meet their own defense requirements and a firm signal to the Iranians of a deterrent kind.

Second, the conditions in that war are rather indefinite. It has gone on for 4½ years. We do not know how long it will go on.

We are dealing here with equipment that could be expendable. In this case you fire off a missile and can't return it.

Both for purposes of conveying a firm signal and the nature of the situation and equipment we are dealing with, we felt the sale was appropriate.

Senator DECONCINI. Of course, you can lease some more?

You do expend them. That does not preclude you from further leasing. That argument, it seems to me, holds water if you are only going to have a one-time lease and you are never going to consider leasing again.

You are not suggesting that that is the reason, are you?

Mr. ARMACOST. No. As I say, we wanted to send a firm signal rather than a tentative signal.

SAUDIS AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Senator DECONCINI. Was there any attempt made to obtain guarantees of some sort from the Saudis for support of U.S. policy in the region vis-a-vis Israel in exchange for the STINGER or other types of military assistance?

For instance, was any discussion in this military exchange about the Saudis joining in the Camp David peace accords, making an official recognition of the State of Israel's right to be a sovereign nation?

I would like to know what the administration policy is of arming a nation that is at war with one of our allies and whether or not we are just going to continue to arm every side of the conflict with no concern and no credibility and no emphasis on what our commitments are?

I am concerned about our commitment to Israel. Is it real or is it something the administration is saying now because it is close to election time. Was there discussion with the Saudis about their participation in the Camp David accords? Maybe the Saudis have agreed to participate and, if so, nothing would be welcomed more and make this Senator happier.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, we have had an arms and security relationship with Saudi Arabia for over 30 years. We have had discussions with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at all levels of its leadership for nearly that time on securing and establishing a framework for peace in the Middle East.

I think that you have seen in Saudi Arabia over the last few years a definite turn in its diplomacy toward a much more forward-leaning effort to help secure, to help advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

I refer particularly to Lebanon and talks between King Hussein and Arafat last year.

Senator DECONCINI. When Sadat made the bold step to join Camp David accords, Saudi Arabia did not recognize him and threw him out.

Does that lead to a peace settlement?

Mr. MURPHY. You are addressing the fact of the 1977 fall-out, as they call it, later with Camp David.

Senator DECONCINI. Is sending hundreds of millions of dollars annually to the PLO an indication they are leaning toward a peace settlement in the Middle East?

Mr. MURPHY. They use foreign assistance for a variety of purposes that we don't necessarily agree with. We have engaged them in a very intensive dialog in the last few years.

Personally, I think their efforts in Lebanon and in trying to bring about an accord last year between the Jordanians and leadership of the PLO were noteworthy.

Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Secretary, my time is up. I apologize to my colleagues, particularly Mr. Rudman, for taking additional time, but that is the weakest defense I have heard of. The Saudis are helping the PLO, and we say they are leaning toward a peaceful settlement there and that say, well, we can't argue with what kind of foreign assistance they give.

Damn it, we ought to argue.

Mr. MURPHY. We do argue.

Senator DECONCINI. Then we ought not give military assistance if they continue.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Rudman.

SOVIET EQUIVALENT OF STINGER

Senator RUDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me get one thing on the record, General Gast, so that we understand one thing.

We are talking about security and these falling into wrong hands. The Soviets presently have the SA–7D which is the counterpart of our REDEYE. The STINGER is a successor to the REDEYE.

It is my understanding that, to our knowledge, the Soviet bloc has no weapon comparable in technology to the present STINGER.

Is that correct or incorrect?

That is information we in the Defense Appropriations Committee were given by the Pentagon.

General GAST. They have none deployed comparable to that.

Senator RUDMAN. In other words, what you are saying is they may have them, but if they do, we don't know about them.

We have a follow-on to the STINGER, post-STINGER, which again is an advance in technology.

General GAST. Yes, sir.

Senator RUDMAN. So, what the Saudis now have under whatever security they were able to give it, and I am sure you have looked into that, is the highest technology deployed by any nation in point-to-point air defense by hand-held weapons?

General GAST. I want to be careful about that. I believe as it exists today, yes, sir.

Senator RUDMAN. I believe that is correct?

General GAST. Yes, sir.

MISSION FOR STINGER

Senator RUDMAN. General Gast, you referred to facilities a number of times in your testimony here today.

Could you tell us or could the panel tell us when these final discussions took place causing this emergency to be declared and the weapons to be transshipped from our supplies?

Specifically, what is the mission that is described for these weapons?

There had to be a mission described for an emergency to be declared under the process.

What was the mission?

General GAST. The mission of these missiles was to augment the air defense capability that they have to protect key facilities, to include the oil transfer facilities, the fields, and the desalinization plants which are a critical part of that.

It was viewed to provide the additional deterrence effect against a possible attacker that could come in and cause major disruptions and major instability as a result of those.

It was put into that context in a very precise mission capability.

Senator RUDMAN. If I understand your answer correctly, and I assume that was your answer from your previous testimony, that although the impetus for the declaration of this emergency is the attacks on tankers, which are seaborne, of course, that these missiles were being supplied to fulfill a mission to defend land-based facilities; is that correct?

General GAST. Yes, sir.

Senator RUDMAN. Is there also a plan to base some of these on small Saudi ships that in some way will attempt to protect tankers?

General GAST. That is affirmative, to give them protection for themselves.

As Mr. Armitage says, that is within our doctrine. Our naval vessels have the STINGER's on board.

Senator RUDMAN. I am very familiar with that and so are you, General. That is something different.

When those were deployed off Lebanon, that was to defend against what we thought would be suicide Kamikazi techniques by propeller-driven aircraft against our carriers and our other ships; is that correct?

General GAST. Yes.

Senator RUDMAN. That is a different threat than we are talking about with the Iranian Air Force as depleted as it is; sad as it is, that is a different ball game, isn't it?

General GAST. If aircraft were attacking one of their ships, it could also have the same capability as a deterrent on the land-based as well.

Senator RUDMAN. The truth is that these have more effect from your point of view in terms of being effective against the land-based facilities?

General GAST. That is affirmative, yes, sir.

Senator RUDMAN. If you put them on a sea-based frigate or small patrol boat or motor torpedo boat and put that 5 or 6 miles to the port or starboard of a particular tanker, if the Iranians have any sense at all, they will come from the other side because it is out of their range.

The fact is that these are point-to-point defense for some of their more extensive facilities that are land-based; is that not correct?

General GAST. And those that we have very much interest in.

Senator RUDMAN. What we are really saying here, Mr. Chairman, is that the administration has expressed a high level of concern, a level of

emergency to defend Saudi Arabian facilities, both the resources in the ground, I assume, and the refining facilities?

General GAST. That is correct.

STINGER CAPABILITY AGAINST MASS ATTACK

Senator RUDMAN. General, I have only one other question because this whole argument on STINGER's doesn't amount to much, as far as I am concerned.

The thing that is of concern to me is how secure they are. That concerns me despite assurances received from the Saudi Government. This is the highest technology available in the world today and in the wrong hands it could be extremely dangerous.

My question is simply this: Do we believe that the Saudis now have any kind of integrated air defense system that would be successful against a mass attack by Iran against its facilities?

Before you answer the question, let me point out to you, General, that the flight time from Bushehr, one of their major bases to Ras Tanura is 15 minutes on the outside. As a matter of fact, if they do a little loitering and hanging around and suddenly make a move from the right spot, it is about 8 minutes.

You have been in the Air Force a long time. You are not seriously telling us and this committee that presently the Saudis could defend with any success against a mass air attack by F–4's and other aircraft using both standoff and conventional munitions against Ras Tanura and other facilities. I think that is an important point to make.

Would you answer that for me?

General GAST. If any enemy air force, whatever it is, decides to make a concerted attack, he will probably break through if he is able to do it. What will be a large determining factor is the price he will pay.

Senator RUDMAN. I think that is a very accurate answer, and I appreciate your candid answer.

The fact of the matter is we are dealing with Iran. If we don't understand them by now, we have been asleep for a long time. If they decide they must take out substantial Saudi facilities, it will take more than the STINGER and their present air defense system to do it.

Maybe they will come back and ask us to help with HAWKEYE's.

The fact of the matter is as far as protecting Saudi oil facilities, this doesn't do it.

Is that correct or incorrect? It helps a little?

General GAST. It helps considerably depending on how capable the Iranian Air Force is.

Senator RUDMAN. The Russian Air Force could not even find a commercial airliner for 2½ hours over their most important territory. I doubt if the Saudis could do a hell of a lot better.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Specter.

USE OF EMERGENCY WAIVER

Senator SPECTER. Gentlemen, I would like to explore for a few moments the issue of the nature of the emergency as that question relates to executive and congressional authority, and as that issue interrelates with the War Powers Resolution on some very vexing and complex questions that we are concerned with.

When the President originally proposed to sell STINGER's to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, there was substantial congressional opposition.

I wrote to the President on March 6 of this year urging that the sale not be completed and some 55 Senators wrote to the President on March 21 urging the sale not be completed.

I received a response from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Inter-Governmental Affairs on April 12 saying that the plans had been discontinued.

Now, the President has proceeded under the so-called emergency authority cited in the transmittal the provisions of law which authorize sale on an emergency basis, but absent that certification, then there can be a concurrent resolution of Congress disapproving the sale.

I take it in his use of the emergency provisions, it was with the implicit recognition that had he not certified to that emergency, that Congress could have stopped the sale with the concurrent resolution of disapproval.

That raises the issue of the Chadha case. I take it from this procedure that the President and the executive branch has acknowledged that the Congress could have disapproved the sale absent the emergency declaration.

Is that true, Secretary Armacost?

Mr. ARMACOST. My lawyer tells me that the administration believes the Chadha decision makes that unconstitutional.

I would like to add in this particular case the reason for proceeding with the emergency waiver was not so much a political judgment about what Congress would support as a foreign policy judgment about the need to move swiftly in response to what we perceived to be a rapid escalation in the conflict.

Senator SPECTER. If Congress could not disapprove it, you didn't need to proceed on an emergency basis, did you?

Mr. ARMACOST. Well, there are notification procedures in the law. It would have required that the notification come up to Congress, and we wait for an extended period of time.

We felt under the circumstances that was not the kind of firm response that was required by the circumstances.

Senator SPECTER. You are saying that the notification provision remains valid even though the disapproval does not?

Notification provisions have real significance absent disapproval conditions.

Mr. ARMACOST. I certainly presume the notification provision remains valid.

EFFECT OF CHADHA DECISION

Senator SPECTER. I would like a followup of that from a legal point of view. It seems to me that Chadha does not affect the concurrent resolution of disapproval under such circumstances. I think that is implicitly recognized in the procedures that you followed.

If you have some different point of view, I would like to see the legal authority for it.

Mr. ARMACOST. I will provide for the record any further comments, Senator.

[The information follows:]

Effect of the Chadha Decision

The 1983 decisions of the Supreme Court in Chadha[1] and related cases[2] confirmed the unconstitutionality of legislative vetoes that operate by concurrent resolution or any other procedure not involving presentation to the President for signature or veto.[3] At the same time, these decisions established certain presumptions in favor of the severability of legislative veto provisions from other provisions in the legislation in question, which would remain valid and operative.[4] Accordingly, the concurrent-resolution veto over arms sales contained in Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act is unconstitutional and inoperative; but other provisions of Section 36(b)(1), such as the requirement for a 30-day waiting period after certification to Congress, remain valid and operative.[5]

Therefore certifications must still be submitted with respect to sales above the thresholds described in the section and, in the case of sales outside NATO, ANZUS and Japan, a letter of offer may not be issued until at least 30 calendar days after the certification is submitted, unless the President states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires the sale in the national security interests of the United States. In the absence of such an emergency, the 30-day waiting period still serves to provide Congress with a period for review of the proposed transaction; however, no action to block such a sale would be legally effective unless adopted in the form of legislation (such as a joint resolution) submitted to the President for signature or veto in accordance with the Constitution.

1/ Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 77 L.Ed. 2d 317 (June 23, 1983).

2/ Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of America and United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1402-03 (July 6, 1983).

3/ In Chadha, the Court stated that Congress may only block or reverse Executive Branch action through "action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President [for signature or veto]." The Court applied this principle to one-House veto provisions in Chadha and Process Gas Consumers, and to a two-House veto provision in U.S. Senate v. FTC.

4/ In Chadha, the Court stated that "the invalid portions of a statute are to be severed 'unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not.'" The Court then stated that there would be a further presumption of severability "if what remains after severance 'is fully operative as a law'" or if the legislation in question contained a severability clause.

5/ On July 28, 1983 Deputy Secretary Dam, in the course of testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that:

> Under the Chadha decision, we believe that the procedures for legislative vetoes in several sections of the Arms Export Control Act are not valid, but that the reporting and waiting periods remain. The Court decision in no way alters the elaborate structure of reporting, consultation, and collaboration that the Executive Branch and the Congress have worked out in recent years to ensure effective Congressional oversight.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF EMERGENCY

Senator SPECTER. The question then of an emergency seems very questionable to me based upon the documents which have been submitted.

The President made a very short statement. He is required under the statute to file a detailed certification of an emergency.

I have a real question as to the compliance with that requirement in terms of the specificity which the President has provided. He has made a short statement of one page, and it is backed up with some secret data which I will obviously respect for purposes of this proceeding, but the long and short of what has been provided here is nothing more or less than was in the public media for many months.

Secretary of State Shultz was before this subcommittee on March 1 of this year, and there was an extensive dialog on the issue of whether the Congress ought to be consulted on problems in the gulf or Straits of Hormuz at that time. The circumstances were very similar to what they are at the present time.

So my real question is what has changed which required on May 30 the President to say that there was an emergency which would not withstand a 30-day period for congressional scrutiny?

Mr. ARMACOST. I think in our judgment, Senator, it was the fact that a number of attacks had taken place within the space of a week in areas that had been outside an exclusion zone which had been understood for some time—attacks in close proximity to Saudi Arabian territory, apparently directed against Kuwaiti and Saudi shipping.

That was the condition which we regarded as requiring a prompt response. It was in the public media, but it seems to me that does not make it any less demanding of an American response.

Senator SPECTER. I only refer to the public media as a matter of not going into detail as to what has been provided on a document marked secret which does not appear to me to be secret at all, nor does the range of the attacks or the threat to Saudi Arabia or to Kuwait.

Hadn't there been a similar threat posed as of April 30?

Mr. ARMACOST. Let me look at the sequence.

Senator SPECTER. I pick 30 days prior to May 30. It seems to me the same kind of threat was in existence at that time.

Mr. ARMACOST. The attacks that created what, in our judgment, represented an emergency, began on May 13. There was one on the 13th, three on the 14th, one on the 16th.

DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY

Senator SPECTER. If you deal with May 13 and then you project to May 30, you have 16 days and we are here on June 5, we are not very far from 30 days.

What I am really groping for is some realistic definition of emergency. I believe that there would be uniform response if the President had to respond in time of a genuine emergency, but the definition of that leaves a lot to be desired with the way the procedures have been followed in this case, at least in my judgment.

I introduced Senate Bill 2670 on May 15 in an effort to try to define an emergency under the War Powers Act so that the President could respond in a general emergency situation without congressional approval, and with some effort to define a period for congressional approval. This way you could have our inputs, and you don't have to come to a hearing like the one you face today and hear the castigation and all the opposition that we are seeing more and more of to try to find some accommodation in the timeframe.

In S. 2670 which seeks to amend the War Powers Act, the effort has been made to define an emergency as one which requires action in less than 5 days.

My own judgment is that each House could act within a period of 2 days and there could be a conference of 1 day so that the Congress could give you its view within a period of 5 days to preclude Presidential action unless there is such an emergency or dire emergency that executive action was necessitated within a 5-day period.

My question to you is: What would you think of an arrangement like that if we described both authorities under the War Powers Act and the sale of items like STINGER's to Saudi Arabia? If you can act, it has to be done in 5 days, but if you can wait 5 days, you have to come to the Congress?

Mr. ARMACOST. You raise the question that has both legislative implications and legal implications.

I would request to provide any comments for the record, Senator Specter. I will be happy to do that.

[The information follows:]

Proposal for a 5-day Emergency Authority

We are not clear as to how the 5-day period suggested by Senator Specter would operate. First, we are not sure whether the intent is to preclude the President from exercising his current emergency authority under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act for an initial 5-day period, or rather to permit him to exercise that authority only if an emergency required the completion of a sale within 5 days. Second, we are uncertain as to whether the 5-day period would be calculated from the date on which the President decided that emergency action was necessary, or from the date on which the events occurred which constituted the emergency.

We would be reluctant to preclude the President under all circumstances from acting until 5 days had expired, particularly if that period were calculated from the date on which the President decided that an emergency sale was necessary. It would not be difficult to conceive of circumstances of great urgency in which the immediate transfer of defense articles or the provision of defense services would be essential to avert the military defeat of a friendly country under attack.

On the other hand, we would also be reluctant to preclude the President from exercising his emergency authority if the sale need not be completed within 5 days, particularly if that period were calculated from the date on which the events

occurred which constituted the emergency. Such a situation typically relates not to a single event but to a series of events over a period of time that may be recognized as requiring emergency action only after a period of interagency analysis, consultation with foreign governments and consideration of alternative courses of action. It is not difficult to imagine situations in which this process may take more than 5 days, but in which action may still be essential in less than the normal 15 or 30-day waiting periods after certification to Congress. In any event, we do not believe it would be useful to encourage precipitate action to meet a 5-day deadline if a further brief period of consideration (including consultation with Congress) might produce a more sensible result.

We believe that the President should retain the authority to respond to emergency situations without any arbitrary time limits on the exercise of that authority. On the other hand, we would welcome any suggestions from Congress that would lead to more effective procedures for consulting with and taking account of the views of Congress in connection with future exercises of this emergency authority.

REASONS FOR U.S. ACTION

Senator SPECTER. Do you have any horseback judgment?

Mr. ARMACOST. Certainly 5 days is different than 30 days.

As I say, we feel there had been a major escalation in the conflict that occurred over a week. This escalation raised profound questions to the Saudis as to the possibility of extension of those attacks on land-based installations.

We felt under those circumstances to go through a normal notification procedure didn't convey a very clear signal of support to a country that we would like to see have a capacity to defend itself. Not the least of our considerations was to make less likely a request to us to provide more direct involvement.

FIVE-DAY PERIOD

Senator SPECTER. You obviously have more than 5 days leadtime.

Mr. ARMACOST. Five days' leadtime from the original request?

Senator SPECTER. From the 13th to the 30th.

We in the Congress have the luxury of being able to sit back and watch what the executive does and criticize if we don't like it or criticize if it does not work out.

The experience in Lebanon has been that the United States had to withdraw because of the criticism which came from the Congress. Had there been authorization in advance, not after-the-fact authorization such as was given, the executive branch would have had a much stronger position.

What I am looking for is some structuring where Congress would have to make its own response in a responsible way.

General, what do you think? Would you like to see a response where the Congress gave its opinion within 5 days when you had that much leadtime?

General GAST. I am sorry, I have not reviewed your language.

Senator SPECTER. Never mind the language.

General GAST. The important thing is that we, the United States and our friends, can respond as rapidly as the case may require. That needs to be demonstrated.

The Congress over the years has developed what we have in the Arms Export Control Act, certain provisions in which it recognized there needed to be emergency authority within the availability of the President and those have grown over many, many years.

In this particular case the status of emergency is and the administration's view was to move rapidly to deter the Iranians and give the Saudis capability so that they could deal with this evolving situation.

Senator SPECTER. One final question.

As a high-ranking military officer you are asked to make very fast judgments and recommendations to the President.

Would you think it a good arrangement if you had at least 5 days' leadtime to get a congressional judgment within that time if Congress was prepared to give it to you?

General GAST. I think that if the Congress itself were able to respond within 5 days at all times, knowing what it was prepared to offer, it would be a matter of consideration between the two bodies, but availability to react without a long dialogue may not be a benefit to the United States.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much.

DISCUSSIONS WITH SAUDIS

Senator KASTEN. I have some addituonal questions by Senator Inouye to submit.

I have also some questions I would like to submit for the record.

I have to say as this hearing has gone on this morning, I think the case for the STINGER missiles and the way it fits into our overall policy is deteriorating right in front of us.

It is more and more clear, and we are going to go back to the record particularly to pick out some of the words you used. I have marked out a couple in answer to Senator DeConcini's leasing question, you said it was not the kind of show of support we wanted for the Saudis.

In answer to Senator Specter, you said the process of consultation with the Congress, going through the process of approval or disapproval, would not have been the clear signal of support we wanted to give to the Saudis.

This idea of a clear signal of support, of relieving the anxiety, et cetera, is becoming overriding to the question of whether or not there was in fact an emergency.

Going back to what Senator Rudman said, the fact that an emergency, if there was one, was not really going to be solved or dealt with adequately by this one particular weapon system. They have already got U.S. AWACS, F–15's, improved HAWK surface-to-air missiles, the REDEYE surface-to-air missiles, SPARROW's, SIDEWINDER missiles on the F–15's, VULCAN radar control antiaircraft guns, French MX–3050 radar controlled guns, Swiss radar-controlled guns.

To maintain it was an absolute emergency that had to be met within 3 or 4 days while Congress was on recess in order to solve this desperate problem, I think is lacking in credibility and, frankly, I think that you have made a serious mistake in terms of your relationship with the Congress and particularly this Appropriations Committee.

First of all, I have been told—I appreciate the help from one of your assistants or associates—in fact, Ambassador Bandar was meeting at the White House with McFarlane on the afternoon of May 25.

The question of what was going on in that meeting and whether Bandar was negotiating for a higher number of STINGER missiles is still an open one.

You said also the Saudis were meeting with you at the same time?

Mr. ARMACOST. Friday afternoon.

DISCUSSION OF LEASING

Senator KASTEN. And the White House meeting was occurring also, but you were not aware of it.

The question of leasing came up, and I assume leasing was part of the discussion with the Saudis.

Was leasing of the STINGER weapon system acceptable to the Saudis?

General GAST. I don't know that they were consulted. I am not aware of any discussion of lease versus sale. I am not aware of it.

Mr. ARMACOST. The comment was about discussion of this within the administration.

General GAST. That was the context in which I was responding to the question.

Senator KASTEN. Ambassador Murphy, are you aware of any discussion of leasing as opposed to outright sale of the STINGER's?

I know you were very much part of the question of leasing versus outright sale of AWACS a number of years ago.

Was leasing of the STINGER missiles acceptable to the Saudis in this case?

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, the request was for immediate delivery of whatever number we could make available.

Senator KASTEN. By sale or lease?

Mr. MURPHY. Without specifics. This is my own conversation out there on the 22nd. I had no further discussion on that.

Mr. ARMITAGE. My discussion was security assistance items and not on any particular basis, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ARMACOST. If I may correct the record, Senator Kasten, I don't want to leave the impression that the premise of this decision makes us feel good.

We believe there was a genuine emergency that arose out of the intensity of attacks for a brief period before the request came in. We believed there was a legitimate defense requirement on the part of the Saudis.

Those were premises on the basis of which we considered our decision.

SAUDI SHOOTDOWN OF IRANIAN F-4

Senator KASTEN. We have information that this morning an Iranian F–4 was shot down near the Saudi coast by the Saudis. That information, I am told, is from our intelligence-gathering agencies.

I am also told two Iranian F–4's have been shot down today.

Can you give me information on what is going on over there right now?

Mr. ARMACOST. I have seen a press report from Riyadh. The Saudi Minister of Defense Aviation stated that this afternoon, Tuesday afternoon, the Saudi early warning system located a target moving toward the Coast of the Saudi Kingdom.

When the target got beyond international waters and entered Saudi territorial waters headed toward its coast, aircraft of the Saudi Air Force engaged it and downed it.

There have been reports of two. We are seeking out the facts on this.

Senator KASTEN. You don't know any more than I do.

Our understanding is that there were two Iranian F–4's, but they are only claiming one of them at this present time.

Mr. ARMACOST. I think there are efforts underway to ascertain whether the second was downed.

KUWAITI REQUEST FOR STINGER

Senator KASTEN. There appears to be some significant differences between the State Department and the Defense Department on the response given to Kuwait on its request for STINGER missiles.

My understanding is State said the U.S. response was a firm no while a Defense Department spokesman, named Michael Burch, did not absolutely rule out the sale of STINGER missiles to Kuwait pending

results, according to the Burch statement, of an ongoing study of Kuwaiti defense requirements.

I am talking about a Washington Post article and also discussions we have had back and forth.

What kind of conclusion by this ongoing study of Kuwaiti defense requirements would result in Defense selling STINGER's to Kuwait as well?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The study is not complete. We will have to see what, in our view and in the Kuwaiti view, are the shortfalls in the air defense, for instance, and other defense areas and then we would have to make a decision, including, of course, the congressional aspect, if a weapon sale were to be forthcoming.

Senator KASTEN. It is possible they would go forward with Kuwait?

The State Department view is incorrect and Defense Department is the administration's view?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I simply said we are reviewing it.

Senator KASTEN. Would these missiles be provided once more on an emergency basis, bypassing Congress, or would you go through some kind of disapproval-approval mechanism or will you wait for the July 4 recess?

Mr. ARMACOST. Let me say there has been a request. It is under study. There has been no decision. We certainly would relate any decision to close consultation with the Congress.

Senator KASTEN. Even if the study would be completed on June 30?

Mr. ARMACOST. I still challenge your contention that this was done over a weekend in order to evade the congressional consultation.

What I am saying is that we would take those consultations into account. We don't expect an imminent decision on this. We recognize we have had a supply relationship with Kuwait over the years, but that relationship is not identical to our relationship with Saudi Arabia, with whom we have had a more intimate connection over a much longer period of time.

Senator KASTEN. If I understand you, you are both saying it is possible we could go forward with the sale of STINGER missiles to Kuwait as well?

Mr. ARMACOST. I am saying we have not made a final decision.

Senator KASTEN. I might point out a number of things happen right before congressional recesses. We always seem to be right up against the debt limit authority right before a congressional recess as well. It just happens that way every single time.

Senator D'Amato.

WIDENING OF THE WAR POSSIBLE

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if we might return to the question of the report that you alluded to that was read. It came over the wire service indicating that the Saudi Arabian fighter shot down an unidentified plane as it moved toward the Saudi Coast.

My question is: Wasn't it done with American AWACS identifying those planes as they came and wouldn't we know whether or not they shot down a plane and wouldn't that not be a further widening?

I was not aware of this until a few moments ago when the Chairman made this information available to me.

Aren't we then heading toward a widening of this conflict, not only with respect to the fact that the AWACS is flown by Americans, but also you have another plane there that is flown by Americans, the KC–10 tanker, et cetera.

Don't you see a potential for widening?

Don't you think that is linked to our rhetoric over and over on the STINGER missiles, what a great thing it is and how we have come down on one side?

I can't for the life of me understand what we think we are going to do.

Do we really want to get into a full-scale war with the Iranians?

Mr. ARMACOST. By no means. We want to stay out of the conflict.

The purpose of providing the Saudis with equipment is to enable them to protect themselves, and thereby avoid a situation in which they would turn to us and ask for our direct intervention.

Senator D'AMATO. They could not even hold a Mosque against a bunch of PLO. The great Saudi empire is a lot of nonsense. What it is is oil wells that they use to buy everybody. When they think they have them, whenever the crunch comes down, they can't deliver.

They didn't deliver a thing with the Syrians, not a thing. Yet we went ahead, abused our friendship, forced the Israelis to withdraw in Beirut, involved ourselves totally unnecessarily and who were the catalysts? Saudis.

When are we going to learn? We gave them AWACS systems. What have they done? Have they participated in the peace process? They paid every threatening group, whether PLO or Syria, every one that creates problems, or where they think they can purchase some defense, they are there to attempt to buy.

Let me ask you, don't you see a further involvement in escalation?

Was it our AWACS that spotted these planes coming in?

Mr. ARMACOST. I suspect it was, yes.

Senator D'AMATO. Aren't you concerned about that?

Mr. ARMACOST. The purpose of the AWACS was to provide information to the Saudis about intruding aircraft into their air defense identification zone.

WAR POWERS

Senator D'AMATO. What about the provision of the War Powers Act? Doesn't that come into force now?

Mr. ARMACOST. In view of the involvement of Saudi aircraft in combat, we will have to take another look at the War Powers notification requirement.

Senator D'AMATO. Senator Rudman said if we don't understand the mentality of the Iranians at this point in time, they are not going to back down to pressure or the fact we are going to send STINGER's. If anything, it will militate them more. It may put them in a position where they may take action they have not heretofore taken.

We abdicated our responsibilities by not seeing to it that the Iraqis have the same standard applied to them in their attacks in the gulf.

The thing that bothers me is that it seems to me that we have deliberately attempted and we have made a very successful effort to create in the minds of the general public that the sale of these STINGER missiles is to protect the neutral shipping in the gulf. That is what we did.

Now for the first time we are saying we are going to use them for land-based areas and even there their effect is rather doubtful.

I just think that we are just rushing to intrude ourselves into this area without using the great strength and leadership, moral and military, that we have to develop a cohesive, fair, balanced policy. It is lacking. I am saddened by it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I take very seriously your comments about not backing one of the parties in a corner, as you see us doing in the case of Iran. That is not in our interest.

What we have not discussed today and I don't want to overload the record on this, but there has been a very consistent effort on the diplomatic side to reach both parties with the message that this war should stop.

Senator D'AMATO. That is the point. You are not going to be able to get the Iranians to stop. They are not going to stop. That is laudable.

Allow them to continue and spell out very clearly we will countenance no interference with shipping in the gulf. That is a fair, balanced, reasonable policy.

Mr. MURPHY. I did want to say that specifically after the Iraqi attacks clumped up in the course of April when they intensified their attacks on shipping, we went to Baghdad with just that message, knock it off.

Senator D'AMATO. But we have not done anything. It seems to me if we clearly announced with all our allies and get the Japanese to put up the money, again, to support some of this, that we will not tolerate, the free world will not tolerate the cutoff of oil, they can slaughter their people, that is one thing, but we will not allow them to interfere with the shipping in the gulf.

That is fair, that is reasonable. That is balanced. I don't like the fact that we will be committing resources there, but we understand the necessity and it is one that is in our own national interest.

But to come down in this manner is, I believe, simply to continue to isolate further the Iranians and give them no choice.

When they see that there is one-sided treatment of this question, I am fearful and there may be someone who wants them to launch these attacks—you know what I am saying to you—there may be some who say this is the logic, if you want them to attack Kuwait, they are going to do it, they are going to attack Kuwait airfields. That is unacceptable to us by policy, and in this manner we bring about something that is totally unacceptable, and we have further escalation and widening of the conflict.

Maybe we can now begin to test out all our systems and see if they are wonderful and see if they work. Of course, the price of oil will go up. We will have a conflict, and we will achieve none of our goals.

This report today is just the beginning. If he has two planes knocked out, maybe he will send in 15, let us knock out some more. He will send in 20. I don't understand it.

SAUDI F-15 DEPLOYMENT

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, the stated purpose of the STINGER sale was to protect the oil fields as well as other areas, that is what they said.

It is my understanding, according to the Defense League and some other kinds of information, I think Newsweek said yesterday, that the Saudis continue to deploy roughly half, possibly a little over half, of their F–15 air force on their northern border, not down in defense of major oil fields.

Is that true?

Is it possible F–15's are on their northern border, not to protect their oil fields?

Mr. ARMACOST. Let us check the actual numbers and supply that for the record. I don't know the exact number.

[CLERK'S NOTE: A classified response has been provided to the subcommittee.]

Senator KASTEN. Are you arguing with me about the percentage or are you saying they have moved their airplanes in the last week?

Mr. ARMACOST. I am just saying I have to check before I can give you an answer.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think we want to discuss operational deployment of their air force.

AIRCRAFT ON NORTHERN BORDER

Senator KASTEN. Newsweek magazine said yesterday over half were at the northern border.

Mr. MURPHY. They have never been at the northern border since they were introduced into the Kingdom, to my knowledge.

Senator KASTEN. If we are interested in protecting the oil fields, are we making every effort to protect the F–15's?

The next question is: Are they on the ground or in the air?

If they are interested in protecting that area, those F–15's should be in the air on a constant basis so they can work to intercept, not on the ground.

Then the next question is: Were our AWACS coordinating that, how long can they stay in the air?

Because of maintenance problems, they can't keep them going. Those are the steps.

Everybody is nodding at me this way. Where are we in the process? Are they moving their airplanes to the right places?

Mr. ARMACOST. In the first place, we are not making decisions. The Saudis make these decisions. We are not seeking to intrude ourselves and inject ourselves in the decisionmaking process and assume, ourselves, responsibility for those kinds of decisions.

With regard to deployment again, these are Saudi operational questions. I don't think an open hearing is the place for us to comment on that.

Mr. ARMITAGE. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat confused by your reference to F–15's on the northern border.

For the record, I am unaware, and I think Ambassador Murphy would state we are unaware, of any deployment of F–15's on the northern border.

Mr. MURPHY. That is what I said.

Mr. ARMACOST. The purpose of the KC–10 tanker was to facilitate more efficient deployment of their air assets and enable them to stay aloft for a longer period.

SOVIET OFFERS OF WEAPONS

Senator KASTEN. There have been some reports that part of our current rationale for providing arms to Saudi Arabia is that the Soviets have made some open-ended offers to supply such weapons.

This is reported by Novak and also in other places.

Have Soviet offers of arms been part of any discussions you have had with representatives of the Saudi Government, either of you?

Mr. ARMACOST. Not in any discussions I have had.

Mr. ARMITAGE. No, sir.

Senator KASTEN. Do you believe that the Soviets have made any offers to supply weapons to the Saudis?

Mr. MURPHY. Not to my knowledge, sir, no.

U.S. PERSONNEL DEPLOYED WITH STINGER

Senator KASTEN. How many military personnel have been sent to train the Saudis in the use of the STINGER, American personnel?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Strictly in the training on the STINGER, there are seven, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. We have 1,300 people over there now. We have seven that will train on the STINGER's?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Strictly on training on the STINGER's, seven.

Senator KASTEN. There are seven people over there that are working on the STINGER's?

Mr. ARMITAGE. No; you said training. There are seven that are training on the STINGER's.

Senator KASTEN. How many military personnel have gone to Saudi Arabia as a result of the new STINGER sale and what classifications are they?

Mr. ARMITAGE. There are 33 who are there, 7 for training, 5 for command and control, and 21 to provide the security.

Senator KASTEN. Will these people be stationed with the Saudi troops at the expected place of combat?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Absolutely not. It is our intention to remove them as soon as possible.

Senator KASTEN. Now, you have the missiles over there and our trainers.

SAUDI OPERATION OF STINGER

How many days will it take to have the missiles that are out protecting those oil fields independently with Saudi people?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Depending on their level of training, between 7 and 21 days.

Senator KASTEN. Senator D'Amato, do you have further questions?

Senator D'AMATO. No.

Senator KASTEN. I have a number of questions, but I know your time and our time is limited.

The subcommittee will certainly continue to revisit this question and we are particularly interested in the sale of STINGER's to Kuwait and to other Arab countries, to other countries anywhere in the world.

SUBMITTED QUESTIONS

We thank you for your testimony this morning. We will have questions that we will submit for the record.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Kasten

KUWAITI REQUEST FOR WEAPONS

Senator Kasten: Have the Kuwaitis formally or informally discussed purchase of any other weapons from the United States in addition to the Stingers? Have they mentioned an interest in acquiring M-60 battle tanks, F-20 fighters, or F-16 fighters?

Secretary Murphy: Our military supply relationship with Kuwait is quite extensive and second only to Saudi Arabia among the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The Kuwaitis purchased A-4 aircraft from the U.S. in the mid-1970s and later acquired the I-Hawk anti-aircraft system and other weapons. In the course of our on-going dialogue on security assistance matters, the Kuwaiti Government has indicated informal interest in an advanced fighter to replace their aging A-4s. The F-20, the F-16, and certain other (including non-U.S.) fighter models have been mentioned as possible replacements. However, we have not held any detailed discussions on this issue. The Kuwaitis have shown no interest to date in the M-60 battle tank.

AWACS INVOLVEMENT IN SHOOTDOWN

Senator Kasten: What was the extent of U.S. involvement in the Saudi downing of the Iranian aircraft?

Secretary Murphy: The U.S. AWACS provided data to the Saudis of Iranian aircraft approaching Saudi airspace as prescribed by the AWACS mission. The Saudis initiated the intercept mission, and carried it out without U.S. involvement.

Senator Kasten: Did the American AWACS provide the data that allowed the Saudis to intercept the Iranian plane?

Secretary Murphy: As I have stated, the AWACS provided the original tracking data of the Iranian aircraft. The intercept itself was carried out by the Saudis.

Senator Kasten: Were the Saudi aircraft refueled by U.S. tanker aircraft, and if so, where did the refueling take place?

Secretary Murphy: The Saudi F-15 which carried out the intercept had not been refueled by the U.S. tanker aircraft.

HAWKEYE AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Senator Kasten: Does the U.S. intend to send Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft into the Gulf to supplement the AWACS?

Secretary Murphy: We do not have a request for Hawkeye, and have no plans to do so.

STINGERS AS DETERRENT AGAINST ATTACKS ON SHIPPING

Senator Kasten: Administration spokesmen have indicated that

they view Iranian attacks on Saudi shipping to be a significant escalation because it involves attacks on neutral shipping headed towards neutral ports. Yet, Saudi Arabia reportedly gives Iraq up to 350,000 barrels a day of oil, and permits arms destined to Iraq to be unloaded at Saudi ports. Do not such actions inflict serious injury on Saudi Arabia's status as a neutral party?

Secretary Murphy: Permissible uses of force are now regulated by the United Nations Charter, which, with certain narrow exceptions, limits the use of force to self-defense against armed attacks. On June 1, following attacks on shipping to and from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Security Council adopted resolution 552, which condemned those attacks on commercial shipping and called for non-interference with shipping to and from States that are not parties to the hostilities. The United States supported this resolution and believes that the distinction drawn between States actually involved in the fighting and other States is desirable in order to avoid any further escalation and widening of the war.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SAUDI DOWNING OF IRANIAN AIRCRAFT

Senator Kasten: According to testimony given this subcommittee, the Stinger missiles were sent to Saudi Arabia primarily to defend oil facilities against air attack. Further, it was indicated that the Stingers would not be used to directly defend tankers. Yet, the emergency situation was created by Iranian attacks on oil tankers, and the Administration justification for use of emergency procedures specifically claimed that attacks on tankers required an immediate response in order to deter additional attacks. How will Stinger missiles act as a deterrent against additional Iranian attacks on merchant ships?

Secretary Murphy: The President's decision to provide Stinger to the Saudis on an urgent basis was based on the escalation of hostilities in the Gulf war in May. The escalation has thus far involved no attacks on Saudi land facilities, but further escalation could threaten Saudi Arabian infrastructure or military installations ashore. Stinger was provided to enhance Saudi Arabia's air defense capabilities, particularly against potential low altitude air attacks on Saudi coastal facilities. In addition to protecting land targets, the Stinger could be used effectively as a deterrent against additional low level attacks on merchant ships and tankers if it were deployed on Saudi naval patrol ships in the Gulf. Such deployment could occur if the threat to shipping continues.

INCREASED SAUDI VULNERABILITY

Senator Kasten: What conditions made Saudi oil facilities more vulnerable May 30 than had been the case April 30?

Secretary Murphy: Escalation in the Iran-Iraq War to include attacks on tankers in the Gulf increased the possibility that a direct attack on Saudi land facilities might take place.

RESUBMISSION OF BALANCE OF STINGER REQUEST

Senator Kasten: When I was consulted on the sale on Thursday, the 24th of May, I was also informed that the Administration would be resubmitting its original request for Stinger to Saudi Arabia, minus the number provided on an emergency basis. What is the status of that resubmission?

Secretary Murphy: The Administration has no intention at this time of resubmitting for Congressional notification the balance of the original Saudi Stinger request.

RESTRICTIONS ON DEPLOYMENT

Senator Kasten: Once the emergency has passed, what restrictions will there be on the deployment of the Stingers in Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Murphy: There are no restrictions on the deployment of Stingers within Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia must be free to defend its territory to the best of its ability.

Senator Kasten: Can they then be deployed in Tabuk near the Israeli border?

Secretary Murphy: The Saudis and we agree that the immediate threat is directed at the Eastern province and Saudi waters in the Gulf. Therefore the Stingers are being deployed in that area and not elsewhere. Unless the Saudi assessment changes and they perceive a threat to their installations elsewhere from low-flying attack aircraft, there would be no reason for them to deploy Stingers at other locations.

STINGER AS A LITMUS TEST

Senator Kasten: Over the last several years, in connection with weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, we have been told repeatedly that the U.S. needs to supply arms in order to demonstrate our commitment to Saudi Arabia.

Was the Saudi demand for Stinger missiles just another litmus test?

Secretary Murphy: The Stinger sale was far more than symbolism. It fills a critical gap in Saudi air defenses at a time of increased threat. The escalation of attacks on tankers, and the possibility these could be followed by further Iranian attacks on Saudi facilities made the rapid provision of the quickly deployable Stinger system a high priority. By increasing the strength of Saudi close in, point air defenses we believe we have made escalation of air attacks less likely and diminished the chance that U.S. forces might be called upon to intervene in the Gulf. Thus, deterrence was the primary reason for the sale. Additionally, the Stinger sale, demonstrating our ability to respond in a timely manner to a real emergency, supports our overall bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia and sends an important message to those harboring aggressive intentions against that Kingdom. However, this was a secondary consideration.

SAUDI DEPENDENCE ON STINGER

Senator Kasten: As far as we can tell, the United States alone has sold Saudi Arabia upwards of $25 billion worth of weapons, and, of course, they have bought weapons from other sources.

How is it after the expenditure of such huge amounts of defense equipment that Saudi Arabia is apparently dependent now on a few hundred short range, hand held missiles?

Secretary Murphy: The Saudis are not dependent only on Stingers; rather, this weapon complements other air defense weaponry that they have deployed previously. Over the years, the Saudis, in keeping with U.S. air defense doctrine, have worked to develop a comprehensive air defense capability consisting of long, medium, and short range weapons. However, there was a serious gap in their air defense capabilities due to the absence in their inventory of short range defensive missiles. We have discussed the possible sale of Stinger with the Saudis for several years. The increased threat to Gulf shipping and friendly states in the area resulting from the Iraq/Iran war made it imperative to provide Stingers to Saudi Arabia immediately. Providing Stinger closes this gap and gives the Saudis a comprehensive air defense system capable of defending against attack at any altitude.

STINGER MISSILES ON LIBYAN TANKERS

Senator Kasten: Media reports indicating that these missiles would be used at sea seem to imply that they will be placed on tankers themselves. Since very few of these tankers are owned by Saudi Arabia -- in fact, a great deal of them are owned by Libya, is it possible that Stinger missiles will be used on board tankers controlled by Libyans?

Secretary Murphy: Should the Saudis decide to deploy some Stingers on ships in the Gulf itself, they would, in all likelihood, place them on naval patrol boats rather than on tankers. Also, it is important to recall that under terms of our transfer agreement Stingers can only be used by Saudi nationals and that their transfer to a third country requires our explicit and written approval. We would not approve any such transfer to Libya.

SAFEGUARDS AGAINST USE BY TERRORISTS

Senator Kasten: The Administration recently announced its campaign against terrorism. Can you tell me if the anti-terrorism campaign will have any effect on arms sales?

Secretary Murphy: This is a difficult question to answer without reference to a specific country. We currently maintain strict export controls for countries designated as supporting international terrorism.

Senator Kasten: If this is indeed a desirable weapon for terrorists, what new safeguards does the Administration anticipate considering in its new campaign?

Secretary Murphy: Although man portable, Stinger is a less

desirable weapon for terrorists than the more easily concealed SA-7, large numbers of which are already in PLO, Libyan, and Syrian hands. With regard to Stinger, Saudi Arabia has agreed to implement a stringent safeguard regime which meets U.S. guidelines. These requirements, which are asked of all non-NATO recipients, are rigorous. The precise details of these safeguard measures are classified.

POSSIBLE THREATS TO SAUDI ARABIA REQUIRING ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT

Senator Kasten: Please outline the possible threats to Saudi Arabia that would require the sale of additional types of equipment?

Secretary Murphy: We consider the general Saudi military capability to be adequate at this time to handle any present threats. No additional emergency transfers of major military items are presently foreseen. However, both threats and the technology to confront them do change over time and these changes could generate requirements for additional equipment.

OUTSTANDING SAUDI REQUESTS FOR WEAPONRY

Senator Kasten: What are Saudi Arabia's outstanding requests for additional weapons and equipment?

Secretary Murphy: We maintain an active dialogue with the Saudis regarding their arms requests. With all requests, we evaluate the Saudi need for the system or weapon, the weapon's availability, impact of a sale on the stability of the region, and implications of technology transfer and releasability. Many items are discussed without being formally requested. Details of those items that have been or are still under discussion remain classified. Of course, as mandated by law, we notify the Congress whenever we are ready to move forward on an LOA.

Senator Kasten: Did the U.S. have any intelligence that Iran intended to attack the oil facilities?

Secretary Murphy: Please see classified response attached separately.

Senator Kasten: Did the U.S. provide any assistance to help Saudi Arabia better protect the oil tankers?

Secretary Murphy: Certainly, the provision of AWACS tracking information to the Saudis is very useful in the protection of tankers off the Saudi coast. I think that this kind of cooperation with the Saudis serves our mutual interests as well as those of all nations dependent on the free flow of oil from the Gulf.

Response to Stinger Missile Report

Senator Kasten: In a report written by Steven R. Bowman and issued by the Congressional Research Service on May 31st, the

effectiveness of the Stinger was called into serious question. Among other things, the report states that the Stinger would be ineffective against enemy aircraft which launched stand-off weapons at significant distance from the targets, questioned its effectiveness against high speed aircraft, and stated that existing countermeasures posed by both Iran and Iraq might defeat the system. The report also stated that in the opinion of the analyst, the Stingers added little to the Saudis' defense capabilities. For the record, please provide a detailed response to this report.

Secretary Murphy:

The Stinger is effective against enemy aircraft and stand-off weapons when the missile system is deployed in accordance with U.S. Army doctrine as a complement to other air defense systems. It is not used as a point defense weapon. The Stinger is deployed in depth to fill air defense gaps and overlap with other systems along the avenues of approach to the defended target. The defensive positions are based on the ordnance release point from the target of the attacking aircraft. Stingers are at the lowest level of defense of the various weapons of an air defense umbrella and are never deployed without regard to interface with the other air defense systems. Its effectiveness against all classes of air targets, to include maneuvering high speed aircraft was measured during its advanced development and full scale engineering development tests from 1973 to 1978. There were 134 test firings, of which 111 valid tests saw a successful hit rate of 91 successes versus 20 failures. The 23 non-valid no-tests were voids due to abnormal occurrences, i.e., test equipment failures and gunner mistakes. In Stinger production lot acceptance firings since 1978, there have been [deleted.]

The Stinger fits into the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces air defense system to fill defense gaps as the man portable low altitude system, as in the U.S. Forces. The low and mid-level air defense systems of Stinger, Shahine/Crotale and Hawk complement each system's deployment in depth in Saudi Arabia.

Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress

Washington, DC 20540

Stinger Air Defense Missiles: Key Weapons Facts

Steven R. Bowman
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
May 31, 1984

On May 29, 1984 the Reagan Administration announced the emergency delivery of 400 Stinger air defense missiles and 200 launchers to Saudi Arabia as part of the Adminstration's response to increased attacks by Iran and Iraq on neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf. The Stingers are accompanied by 8 U.S. Army trainers and 20 security personnel. They are to be deployed at key petroleum terminals, port facilities, and aboard Saudi naval patrol craft. On May 31, press reports indicated that the government of Kuwait will formally request to purchase an undetermined number of Stinger missiles. 1/

The Stingers provided Saudi Arabia were taken from the U.S. Army inventory, which at the end of FY83 stood at 4,873 missiles. The Stinger is currently being produced at the rate of approximately 1,700 missiles per year.

Stinger's Characteristics

The Stinger is a man-portable, low altitude air defense missile with a heat-sensing guidance system. It is a "fire and forget" missile which requires no ground control guidance once launched. Designed to replace the Redeye missile, the Stinger's improvements include an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) interrogator and a more sensitive infra-red guidance system which permits engaging targets from all aspects.

The actual performance characteristics of the Stinger remain

1/ Washington Post. May 31, 1984. p. 1

classified. The Army, however, has reported that the Stinger has performed satisfactorily in operational testing against high-speed maneuvering fixed-wing aircraft and hovering rotary-winged aircraft. It is estimated to have a range of three nautical miles and a speed of Mach 2. 2/

CRS-2

The Stinger is a relatively simple system to operate, requiring only visual acquisition of the target, activation of the launch system, and firing. The missile is a self-contained round, transportable in its launch container, and requires no field maintenance or testing equipment. Its simple operation and minimal logistical requirements will make the training of Saudi personnel and deployment of the missile a rapid process.

Stinger's Military Effectiveness

The effectiveness of previous infra-red (IR) homing air defense missiles has been marginal due to the ease with which IR countermeasures (pyrotechnic chaff) or abrupt high-speed maneuvers could defeat the sensors. Though it is a definite improvement over the Redeye, which could engage targets only from the rear, it is unclear to what extent the Stinger is still susceptible to IR countermeasures. The fact that the Army has deemed it necessary to develop a follow-on model, the Stinger-POST (Passive Optical Seeking Technique) with an improved capability in a countermeasures environment, indicates that the Stinger still has operational shortcomings. [The missiles delivered to the Saudi Arabia are not Stinger-POSTs.]

It could be expected therefore that aircraft having infra-red countermeasures (IRCM) equipment might defeat the Stinger guidance system. All the modern attack aircraft in the Iranian and Iraqi Air Forces (Iran: F-4E's and F-5E's; Iraq: Mig-21's, Mig 23's, SU-20's, and Mirage F/E's) can carry such equipment, though the extent of its deployment is not known. The attack aircraft of the Israeli air force (F-15's, F-16's, F-4E's, Mirage III's, and Kfirs) all possess IRCM capability.

A further limitation of all man-portable air defense missiles developed

2 / Department of Defense Congressional Data Sheets, Fiscal Year 1985.

to date is that there is no long-range target acquisition capability. They can provide no protection against aircraft launching stand-off weapons at significant distances from the target. Additionally, against high-speed aircraft the missile operator must spot, aim, and launch the missile in a very short period of time. Depending on the terrain, weather, and the speed and tactics of the attacking aircraft, a missile operator may have only 10 to 15 seconds to launch the missile after target acquisition. [An aircraft approaching at 400 mph travels one mile in less than 10 seconds.] This constraint on the Stinger's effectiveness could be particularly important with newly trained Saudi personnel opposing experienced combat pilots.

It should be noted that the Stinger was originally designed to provide an infantry company limited battlefield air defense in the absence of more sophisticated missiles or antiaircraft artillery. It was not designed to provide the air defense of key installations, or intended for use at sea. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy deployed Stingers on ships stationed off Beirut to augment point defenses against possible suicide air attack, and it may well be that the Saudi's most effective use of the Stinger will be on naval craft providing tanker escort.

Question: I would now like to discuss the effect of the sale on U.S. military inventory.

How many Stinger missiles were in U.S. inventory before the shipment?

Which Services use them and in what numbers?

From what U.S. units were these Stinger missiles taken? And how will the readiness of those units be affected?

How long will it take to replace the missiles sent to Saudi Arabia?

Answer: At the time of the decision to provide Stingers to Saudi Arabia, U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps units held (d) Stinger weapon and missile rounds. Of this quantity, (d) Stingers were with the Navy and Marine Corps. In addition, there were (d) Stingers in the depots waiting issue to units. The Stingers delivered to Saudi Arabia were taken from these depot stocks. The replacement of the 400 weapon and missile rounds will come from new production which averages 234 units per month for the Army.

Question: Regarding the Saudi communications equipment, do they have the capability of communicating between our AWACS, their Air Force, ground troops, and their patrol boats?

Answer: The Saudi Arabian Armed Forces (SAAF) are investing heavily in the latest military command, control and communications equipment to link all elements of their military with the Saudi national command authorities. Before the Stinger missile systems were turned over to the SAAF, a U.S. Central Command team verified that the required command and control capability was in effect from the designated commanders to the various military units that will eventually have Stingers.

Question: The Saudis have claimed they need the Stinger missile because they do not have low level air defense capability.

What is the range of the Hawk missile?

What is the range of the Shahine surface to air missile?

What additional equipment have the French provided the Saudis besides the AMX-305A and the Shahine?

Answer: The Saudi Arabian Armed Forces (SAAF) requested the Stinger missile system to complement their other mid-altitude and mid to low-altitude air defense weapons. The Stinger is a highly mobile weapon for the lowest altitude defense. It is employed with other weapons in an overlapping defense in-depth role.

The Improved Hawk missile is a mid to low-altitude air defense weapon with a 25 mile range. Its altitude engagement envelope is 90 feet to 60,000 feet.

The French Shahine surface-to-air missile, a newer version of the Crotale mid-level air defense missile system, has a seven mile range. Its altitude engagement levels are 45 feet to 15,000 feet.

Besides the Shahine and AMX-30 tank, the Government of France has also provided the SAAF with Crotales, AMX-10

armored fighting vehicles, AML-M3 armored personnel carriers, AML-90 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 155mm howitzers, HOT anti-tank missiles, and AMX-30A 30mm air defense guns. The SAAF recently contracted with the Government of France for 24 Dauphin anti-submarine warfare helicopters, four 2,000 ton frigates and two 10,000 ton oiler/replenishment ships.

Question: Do non-Saudi pilots fly any Saudi aircraft? Do they fly any American aircraft, including the F-5 and F-15 fighters?

Answer: There is a contingent of Pakistani officers seconded to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) who serve principally in technical and administrative positions. [Deleted.]

Question: Has the United States provided any training in Saudi Arabia to any non-Saudi personnel, or personnel with dual Saudi and non-Saudi nationality, attached to either the Saudi armed forces or national guard?

Answer: The United States Air Force has provided F-5 aircraft pilot training in Saudi Arabia to Pakistani pilot officers seconded to the Royal Saudi Air Force and to Bahrain Defense Force pilots serving in the Royal Saudi Air Force. The United States Army has trained Pakistani officers and enlisted personnel seconded to the Saudi Arabian Land Forces on the Vulcan Air Defense Gun in Saudi Arabia.

Question: Have the capabilities of the AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia been enhanced in any way since the original notification to Congress of the sale of the aircraft in 1981? For example, have the Saudis been allowed to acquire more capable electronics, including that used with the radar and the computer systems, improved software, or different engines from the ones authorized by Congress in September 1981? Has the Congress been notified of such changes under the provisions of Section 36(b)?

Answer: There has been a modification to the original AWACS configuration which the administration proposed for sale to Saudi Arabia in 1981. The AWACS aircraft to be delivered to the Saudis are being re-engined with a newer engine that is more reliable and fuel efficient. This will enable the AWACS to have a longer loiter time on station between refueling operations. There were consultations with Congressional staff members on this matter, and no opposition was expressed. The re-engineering is being accomplished on the production line and within the dollar value originally notified to the Congress. There are also possible improvements to the aircraft with secure radio teletypes, data links and VHF radio relays.

Questions Submitted by Senator D'Amato

WHY SO MANY MISSILES

Senator D'Amato: It has been indicated that the primary purpose of the sale is to enhance Saudi security against Iran. Estimates indicate that the Iranian Air Force consists of a small number of aircraft.

Why are so many missiles needed in light of the size of Iranian Forces?

Secretary Murphy: The number of missiles recently supplied to the Saudis reflects a balance between defending targets most at risk and limitations on the number that the U.S. could immediately provide. You have to remember that the Saudi coastline vulnerable to Iranian attack is very long. There are many military, oil and infrastructure facilities that the Saudis desire to protect. The number of systems needed for defense has to be based on the minimum necessary to cover the wide variety of targets since there is no way of knowing where the Iranians would choose to commit their forces.

Senator D'Amato: Are we even sure that the Saudis are prepared to use the Stingers against say Iran?

Secretary Murphy: The Saudis have recently proven that they are willing to defend their territorial integrity as well as the right of free passage of ships in the Gulf. We therefore believe that the Saudis would use the Stinger if necessary against enemy attack.

THE SALE OF STINGER MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA

Senator D'Amato: In the official statement announcing the sale, the Department indicated that "Saudi Arabia has agreed to strict safeguards to insure the security of the missiles."

What specific guarantees have the Saudis made with regard to the security of these sophisticated missiles?

Secretary Murphy: Saudi Arabia has agreed to extraordinary safeguards for the use and storage of STINGERS in its possession. For example, the safeguards now applied to Redeye, such as special requirements regarding construction facilities, guards, lighting and fencing, will also be applied to STINGER. In addition, new safeguards have been developed for the Middle East region and elsewhere to make theft by terrorists even more difficult. The precise details are classified.

Senator D'Amato: Will the launchers and missiles be stored separately?

Secretary Murphy: Yes. Our agreement provides for separate storage of key components, the grip stock and missile/launch tube.

Senator D'Amato: Will the U.S. have full access to ensure compliance?

Secretary Murphy: The agreement also provides for random U.S. access to inventory the missiles.

WHY DID THE NUMBERS CHANGE?

Senator D'Amato: Earlier this year, the Administration proposed the sale of 1200 Stingers to Saudi Arabia. In light of considerable Congressional opposition to that sale, the proposal was withdrawn.

There was an initial indication that 200 Stingers would be sent to Saudi Arabia because of the current situation in the Gulf region. Then all of a sudden the number was doubled to 400.

Why was there an increase on the number of Stingers to be sold to the Saudis?

Secretary Murphy: In assessing the need for Stingers, we had to weigh a number of factors. One was our rough estimation of how many systems were needed for defense of the Eastern Province. Another was availability in U.S. stocks. A third was our desire to respond in a way which Iran would perceive as clearly supportive of Saudi Arabia and hence would act as a further deterrent to Iran. In trying to balance all these factors there was no one perfect number or ideal answer. We believe the final decision of 200 systems and 200 reloads was appropriate to meet the situation. While there was discussion of the number of 100 systems, as there was of other numbers, no decision on that number was ever made.

ADDITIONAL STINGERS AT THIS TIME

Senator D'Amato: In light of the Administration's original request for 1200 Stingers, can we expect to have a request for additional Stingers for the Saudis?

Secretary Murphy: The Administration has no intention at this time of resubmitting for Congressional notification the balance of the original Saudi Stinger request.

TANKERS AND OTHER ARMS SALES

Senator D'Amato: There have been reports that the Saudis have come to the Administration with shopping list of arms which it feels are vital to its defense including aerial tankers and bomb racks for the F-15.

How many tankers have been sent to the Saudis?

Secretary Murphy: One additional aircraft, a KC-10 Extender, has been deployed to supplement the three KC-135s already present. This tanker, like the KC-135's, remains under U.S. control.

Senator D'Amato: What are the terms under which these tankers were sent?

Secretary Murphy: These tankers are fully under USAF control and are deployed to enhance support operations of the U.S. AWACS

and Saudi F-15s. The U.S. has deployed aerial tankers in Saudi Arabia as part of the AWACS operation since 1980. The additional tanker capacity provided by this new aircraft will permit longer patrols by the Saudi F-15s.

Senator D'Amato: What other weapons sales to the Saudis are under consideration?

Secretary Murphy: We maintain an active dialogue with the Saudis regarding their arms requests. With all requests, we evaluate the Saudi need for the system or weapon, the weapon's availability, impact of a sale on the stability of the region, and implications of technology transfer and releasability. Many items are discussed without being formally requested. As mandated by law, we notify the Congress whenever we are ready to move forward on an LOA.

Questions Submitted by Senator Inouye

RATIONALE FOR STINGERS

Senator Inouye: The United States has provided Saudi Arabia 400 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and 200 shoulder-held launchers.

How does the provision of these missiles serve Saudi interests

Secretary Murphy: The Iran-Iraq War has escalated to the poin where neutral shipping has been attacked with increasing frequency and in an ever-widening area in international waters in the Gulf. Saudi flag ships off the Saudi coast have already been attacked, and further escalation could threaten vital installations in Saudi Arabia.

In view of our long and close relationship with the Saudi Kingdom and the urgency of the situation, we decided to provide Stinger as expeditiously as possible. Because the Stinger system can be deployed in the field shortly after delivery, and because i fills a gap in the Saudi air defense system for short range defensive cover, an immediate transfer to Saudi Arabia of this system is an appropriate response to the current crisis that will serve to enhance Saudi air defenses while the Saudis with support from the U.S. and other states attempt to defuse the situation through diplomatic means.

Senator Inouye: How do they serve the interests of peace in the region?

Secretary Murphy: The escalation of the Gulf war could deny vital oil supplies to much of the free world, including particular our major allies in Western Europe and East Asia. The provision o Stinger to the Saudis should help to deter hostile actions against Saudi facilities, and thus lower the risk of broader conflict.

Senator Inouye: How does the provision of these missiles serv U.S. interests?

Secretary Murphy: All of what I have said with regard to how the provision of Stingers serves Saudi interests also applies to U.S. interests. We and the Saudis share the same goals of wishing to avoid a broadening of the conflict and an escalation of fighting in the Gulf, as well as of continuing to ensure freedom of navigation in order that oil supplies to the West continue uninterrupted. The security of Saudi Arabian oil installations is also, of course, a matter of considerable interest to us both because of their importance to world oil availabilities and because of the numerous American citizens employed in and around these installations.

In addition, it is certainly in U.S. national interests that the Saudis and other Gulf countries be assisted in enhancing their own defenses against potential hostile attack. A strong first line of defense of the countries in the region lessens the likelihood that we would be asked to commit our own armed forces to aid in the defense of the area.

Senator Inouye: Have the Saudis agreed to provide the use of military facilities by the U.S. in an emergency?

Secretary Murphy: As the President has stated, we would not engage in any military activity in the Gulf unless requested publicly to do so by countries in the region. In the event that we would become involved, we would expect that those countries requesting our assistance would cooperate with us as necessary.

CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE SALE OF STINGERS

Senator Inouye: The Administration has for some time thought it desirable to sell Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia. In the face of strong Congressional opposition, the sale did not proceed.

Can you outline for the Subcommittee the changes, in both the situation of the conflict in the Gulf and in the Administration's perception of Congressional views, which led you to provide these missiles now?

Secretary Murphy: Rapid escalation in the Iran-Iraq war to include attacks on tankers in the Gulf increased the possibility that a direct attack on Saudi land facilities might take place. We therefore decided that the provision of Stingers to Saudi Arabia was required immediately. Given this situation, and in response to an urgent request for Stingers from Saudi King Fahd, the President made the decision to use his emergency waiver authority in order to expedite the delivery of Stingers.

The Administration, keenly aware of Congressional sensitivities on this issue, consulted closely with the Congressional leadership regarding the decision on the Stinger sale. We received a wide variety of views and tried to take these into consideration in reaching our final decision. These very necessary consultations took place over several days and are one reason why the final decision was made late in the week, on the eve of the Memorial Day weekend.

U.S.-JORDAN JOINT LOGISTICS PLANNING

Senator Inouye: How has the situation in the Gulf affected the Administration's perception of Congressional opposition to U.S. funding for a Jordanian strike force?

Secretary Murphy: The situation in the Gulf has served to underscore the importance of U.S.-Jordan Joint Logistics Planning Program(JLP) as a cost-effective and efficient mechanism to respond to requests from friendly Gulf states, should they ask for help.

As you know, on May 15, the Administration asked Congress to defer action, without prejudice, on the JLP, which remains a classified program. This decision was taken following close consultation and agreement between the Governments of Jordan and the United States. We agreed more time was needed to review the components and costs of the JLP. When that review is completed, the Administration fully intends to resubmit the JLP to Congress for appropriate action. We hope Congress will support the Administration in this effort.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALLIES

Senator Inouye: Mr. Secretary, most of the oil shipped from the Persian Gulf is destined for countries other than the United States. Japan and Western Europe are the major consumers, I believe. What tangible contribution have Japan and Europe made to security in the Gulf?

Secretary Murphy: Our allies have worked both bilaterally and in international fora to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict. They share our concern about the situation in the Gulf and agree with us that the first priority must be to find a diplomatic solution. The Allies have supported UN and other efforts to seek a cease-fire and the beginning of negotiations. The British and French were active in supporting UN Security Council Resolution 540 of last October and the more recent Resolution 552. They also took an active part in the recent EC-10 demarches which expressed concern about the attacks on shipping and underscored the importance of freedom of navigation.

Because of its unique acceptability in Tehran and Baghdad, Japan has played a valuable role as interlocutor with both parties. It continues to play that important role.

Through bilateral and multilateral channels, the European allies and Japan have discussed with us how to meet a disruption in energy supplies from the Gulf. Energy preparedness and the Gulf situation were also discussed at the recent London Economic Summit.

The allies discussed Gulf developments in the North Atlantic Council Spring Ministerial and recognized that events outside the NATO treaty area may affect their commitments as members of the Alliance.

While agreeing on the pursuit of a diplomatic solution, both Britain and France have taken steps that could provide security for shipping, should that become necessary.

Senator Inouye: Would you say that France has played a responsible role in the region? Both sides in the Gulf war are using Exocet missiles, are they not?

Secretary Murphy: France has played an active diplomatic role in attempting to find a resolution of the conflict through diplomatic means, both bilaterally and multilaterally. France supported the deliberations of the United Nations which produced UN Security Council Resolution 540 of last October, calling for a ceasefire and reaffirming the right of freedom of navigation in the international waters of the Gulf. It also was actively engaged in the passage of Resolution 552, which was initiated by the Gulf states. France was instrumental in the recent demarche of the EC-10 to both belligerents, expressing concern about the attacks on shipping and underscoring the importance of freedom of navigation.

While France is engaged in the pursuit of a diplomatic solution, it has taken steps that could provide security for shipping, should that become necessary.

Only Iraq is using Exocet missiles. Iran does not have the Exocet.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR ALLIES

Senator Inouye: Why has this matter, particularly since the recent escalation, not been placed before the UN Security Council? Does the U.S. Ambassador to the UN view the Security Council with disfavor?

Secretary Murphy: It was the recent escalation which prompted the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council to approach the Security Council on May 21 with a complaint against Iranian attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The complaint resulted in Resolution 552, which reaffirms the right of free navigation in international waters and sea lanes to non-belligerent ports and calls upon all states to respect that right, in accordance with international law. The United States supported this resolution, which was adopted 13-0 with two abstentions.

The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, believes that the Security Council can play a key role in international affairs. She welcomed SC consideration of the Iran-Iraq war and fully supports all efforts under UN auspices aimed at bringing about a ceasefire and a resolution of the war.

KUWAIT AS A TARGET FOR TERRORISM

Senator Inouye: This morning's Washington Post suggests that Kuwait may be the next victim of Iranian state terrorism.

How does the State Department view this situation?

Secretary Murphy: I would not wish to speculate on the Washington Post story. Suffice it to say that the tragic bombings of several targets in Kuwait last December -- including one which

severely damaged our own Embassy -- are a clear indication of the very real threat which Kuwait and the other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council face from terrorism, whether sponsored formally by a specific government or not. The governments of the various Gulf states are all aware of their vulnerability to such attacks and subversion and have taken steps to counter attempts to undermine their stability. The U.S. is trying to be helpful in this regard, and we will be using the assistance and expanded cooperation available under the new Anti-Terrorism Cooperation Program to the extent this is applicable.

KUWAIT'S STINGER REQUEST

Senator Inouye: Does the Administration intend to provide Stinger missiles to Kuwait? Have you already done so? What other equipment do you propose to provide Kuwait?

Secretary Murphy: The possible sale of this system to Kuwait was reviewed thoroughly from a number of standpoints: their availability from U.S. stocks; their military applicability to Kuwait's current air defense needs; our existing security assistance relationship with Kuwait; probable Congressional reactions; and other factors. We concluded that it was not advisable to proceed with a sale of Stingers to Kuwait at this time because such a sale would involve a lengthy public debate that could have a negative impact on the situation in the Gulf.

While informing the Government of Kuwait of our decision, we are at the same time developing a proposal which, when approved, should greatly improve the effectiveness of their air defense system in the near term. We have been able to develop this proposal promptly because of military discussions already underway following the visit of Kuwait's Defense Minister last April.

GULF SECURITY

Senator Inouye: Has any Gulf state offered to the United States the use of airfields for tactical operations?

Secretary Murphy: No, no Gulf state has made such an offer.

Senator Inouye: How does this affect U.S. operations and options for providing security to the Gulf?

Secretary Murphy: The U.S. has not been asked to provide security for the Gulf, nor has it unilaterally assumed such a role. With our carrier task group in the North Arabian Sea, the ships of the Middle East Force, and our AWACS aircraft, we have sufficient assets and capabilities for our present situation. Obviously, however, land-based tactical aircraft would improve these capabilities. You should refer questions to the Department of Defense concerning specifics of U.S. military operations.

Senator Inouye: Is it not less dangerous and risky to conduct tactical operations from land bases rather than carriers at sea?

Secretary Murphy: There are too many variables to make such a general answer useful. In many occasions it is less risky, less

dangerous, and more feasible to operate from a carrier. The carrier can provide more flexibility, mobility, and security. However, this is not to say that given certain contingencies we would never want access to land bases to support any operations in which we might find ourselves. You should address this question to the Department of Defense for an authoritative response.

Senator Inouye: Is it true that the U.S. aircraft carrier America is moving onto station to provide tactical air support for Saudi operations.

Secretary Murphy: The USS America has relieved USS Kitty Hawk in the North Arabian Sea for a routine and previously scheduled deployment. She was not sent to provide tactical support for the Saudis.

Senator Inouye: If the U.S. were to provide such support, would it expect to use Saudi bases?

Secretary Murphy: If the U.S. were actively involved in tactical operations in the Gulf in support of our friends and peace in the Gulf, it would be at the invitation of our friends. We would expect and need access to land bases.

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Senator KASTEN. Thank you very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., Tuesday, June 5, the hearing was concluded and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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